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ARTICLES
REDISCOVERING VULGAR CHARITY: A
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF AMERICA'S
TANGLED NONPROFIT LAW
Thomas Kelley*
It is as if I were sitting on the neck of a man, and, having quite
crushed him down, I compel him to carry me, and will not alight
from off his shoulders, while I assure myself and others that I am
very sorry for him, and wish to ease his condition by every means in
my power except by getting off his back. 1
INTRODUCTION

Charitable2 organizations in the United States find themselves in a

* Clinical Professor of Law and supervisor of the Community Development Law
Clinic, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill School of Law. A.B., Harvard
1984, J.D., Northeastern 1991. Thanks to my colleagues Gail Agrawal, Melissa
Jacoby, Gene Nichol, and Deborah Weissman for guidance and encouragement; to
my research assistants Jeffery Berger, and Debra Eidson, for chasing down, among
other things, obscure historical works; to Bill McCarthy, for providing me a
comfortable space in which to think; and to the Council for International Exchange of
Scholars, on whose time I wrote the final sections of this Article.
1. Leo Tolstoy, What Is to be Done?, in The Complete Works of Lyof N. Tolstoi
81 (New York, Thomas Y. Crowell & Co. 1984).
2. The nomenclature of charity is variable and confusing. In its broadest sense,
charity can be taken to mean giving help to those in need. See William Diaz, For
Whom and For What? The Contributions of the Nonprofit Sector, in The State of
Nonprofit America 517 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002). A standard dictionary
definition provides that charity is:
1. the love of God for man or of man for his fellow men 2. an act of good will
or affection 3. the feeling of good will; benevolence ... 5. a) voluntary giving
of money or other help to those in need b) money or help so given c) an
institution or other recipient of such help ....
Webster's New World Dictionary (Second College ed. 1972). Used in this sense,
charity is a general term that encompasses everything from an individual giving a
quarter to a homeless person on the street to private foundations that fund complex
social purpose enterprises.
Some commentators distinguish charity from
philanthropy, defining the former as person-to-person attempts to alleviate suffering
and the latter as more ambitious efforts that devote private resources to systematic
social problems, not necessarily those that affect only the poor. See, e.g., Maurice G.
Gurin & Jon Van Ti!, Philanthropy in Its Historical Context, in Critical Issues in
American Philanthropy: Strengthening Theory and Practice 3 (Jon Van Ti! et al. eds.,
1990) (calling philanthropy the "prudent sister" of charity" (internal quotation marks
2437
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double bind these days. On one hand, our free-market American
culture expects them to be entrepreneurial and bottom line-oriented.
Our government and the donor community tell them they must be
lean and efficient, establish metrics to measure and ensure
organizational outcomes, develop synergistic partnerships with forprofit organizations, identify and exploit their comparative
advantages, recruit leadership with vision and entrepreneurial zeal,
market themselves effectively, articulate their "deliverables," and,
often times, find ways to charge fees or otherwise generate earned
income so that they can pay their own way. 3 In short, they must retool
to become more like successful commercial enterprises. On the other
hand, courts and governmental agencies, the Internal Revenue
Service ("IRS") in particular,4 tell charitable organizations that if they
omitted)); see also Bruce R. Hopkins, The Law of Tax-Exempt Organizations 87 (7th
ed. 1998). The Filer Commission of the 1970s, which was charged with studying
philanthropy and charity in the United States, avoided using those terms because it
feared they smacked of noblesse oblige. It preferred the term "private giving for
public purposes." Comm'n on Private Philanthropy & Pub. Needs, Giving in America:
Toward a Stronger Voluntary Sector 53 (1975) (internal quotation marks omitted). In
the realm of American law, the term "charity" is exasperatingly variable and
confusing. In cases and statutes charity is sometimes used in the general dictionary
sense, described above. See, e.g., Ould v. Wash. Hosp. for Foundlings, 95 U.S. 303,311
(1877); Bok v. McCaughn, 42 F.2d 616, 619 (3d Cir. 1930). It also is used to refer to
the general category of nonprofit organizations that qualify for tax exemption under
section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. This broad category includes
organizations that "test for public safety" and "foster national or international
amateur sports competition[s]." I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000); see Hopkins, supra, at 85.
Next, the word charity denotes a still-broad subcategory within section 501(c)(3)
comprised of those organizations and activities that engage in
Relief of the poor and distressed or of the underprivileged; advancement of
religion; advancement of education or science; erection or maintenance of
public buildings, monuments, or works; lessening of the burdens of
Government; and promotion of social welfare by organizations designed to
accomplish any of the above purposes, or (i) to lessen neighborhood
tensions; (ii) to eliminate prejudice and discrimination; (iii) to defend human
and civil rights secured by law; or (iv) to combat community deterioration
and juvenile delinquency.
Treas. Reg. § l.501(c)(3)-l(d)(2) (as amended in 1990). In spite of these broad uses
of the term charity, it sometimes is used more narrowly in the law to mean "assistance
to the poor, the indigent, the destitute." Hopkins, supra, at 86. This latter use
sometimes is referred to as the "vulgar" meaning of charity. Id. Internal Revenue
Service ("IRS") regulations do little to clarify the legal meaning of charity.
Regulations accompanying section 501(c)(3) tell us only that the word "charity" is
used by the IRS in its "generally accepted legal sense." Treas. Reg. § l.501(c)(3)l(d)(2). A good deal of this Article will be devoted to peeling back the layers of
confusion over what we as a society and as a legal system mean by charity. For the
sake of clarity, however, we shall begin with the assumption that the word "charity,"
when it appears in this Article, is used in its broadest sense-the first definition
discussed in this now over-long footnote-unless otherwise indicated.
3. See infra Parts 11.D.l-2; see also Dennis R. Young & Lester M. Salamon,
Commercialization, Social Ventures, and For-Profit Competition, in The State of
Nonprofit America, supra note 2, at 423.
4. In theory, states' attorneys general or other specified state authorities are
charged with regulating charitable organizations. In fact, few states devote significant
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follow the path to the marketplace, they may pay the ultimate price:
loss of federal tax exemption. Charities live in fear of being ensnared
by confusing and contradictory legal doctrines such as the operational
test, the commerciality doctrine, the unrelated business income tax
("UBIT"), and the commensurate-in-scope doctrine, all designed, at
least in part, to prevent them from looking and acting too
commercial. 5
Contemporary American charities might find some comfort in the
knowledge that the problem is not of their making. The present fix
they find themselves in has deep historical roots in the AngloAmerican legal tradition. For several hundred years, our culture has
developed a vibrant charitable tradition without ever agreeing as a
matter of culture or law on what "charity" means. 6 In our tradition,
and in our contemporary culture, charity is a compassionate act of
aiding the poor, of distributing alms to the needy, and spooning soup
to the hungry. At the same time, it is a tool for social engineering, for
efficiently producing socially beneficial results that will lighten the
burdens on our government. These are two very different conceptions
of charity, but the legal doctrines that govern charity in the United
States do not clearly distinguish between them.
This Article will argue that the increasing confusion in the
contemporary American law of charity stems from the fact that our
society has moved and is continuing to move toward a resultsoriented, quasi-commercial, social engineer's conception of charity,
while our law has continued to encourage, and often insist upon, a
compassionate brand of "vulgar" charity. Part I of this Article will
take us back to the origins of Anglo-American charity so that we can
understand where the definitional split began and how AngloAmerican charity evolved to the point that vexes us today. 7 It will
then discuss how those early conceptions of charity were transplanted
resources to monitoring the charitable nonprofit sector, and the IRS, working through
the tax code, has become the de facto watchdog. See James J. Fishman, The
Development of Nonprofit Corporation Law and an Agenda for Reform, 34 Emory
L.J. 617,639 (1985).
5. See infra Part 11.C.
6. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. Our confusion about the practical
and legal definition of charity is remarkable when one considers that we in the United
States like to view ourselves as a people committed to charity, philanthropy, and
voluntary associations. See David Wagner, What's Love Got To Do With It? A
Critical Look at American Charity, ix-x, 1-2 (2000).
7. A wealth of scholarly material traces the roots of American charity and
philanthropy back to the ancient Greeks and beyond. Many of these historical
narratives pause for a significant examination of the Poor Laws of Elizabethan
England, which most view as seminal to America's law of charity. See, e.g., Walter I.
Trattner, From Poor Law to Welfare State: A History Of Social Welfare in America
(6th ed. 1999). For a British perspective, see Francis Gladstone, Charity, Law and
Social Justice (1982). Though we will try not to belabor this oft-told history, we will
review it thoroughly enough to understand the divergent trends that have led to the
schizophrenic nature of American charity law.
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to the United States, giving rise to our current legal confusion. Part II
will focus on the law of charity in the United States, paying particular
attention to four doctrines that are causing confusion and
consternation for today's entrepreneurial charities because they are
premised upon an unsettled cultural and legal definition of charity.
This Article will not attempt to resolve the question of whether
contemporary
America's
embrace
of
market-oriented,
entrepreneurial charity is a positive or negative phenomenon. Nor
will it provide a detailed policy prescription for getting us out of the
mess we find ourselves in. However, Part III will offer a broad
suggestion for adapting our laws to better fit our society's evolving
conception of charity, and will put forward the simple conclusion that
we as a society should not continue to do what we are doing. We
should not force charities to embrace the marketplace and pay their
own way, and at the same time leave in place legal doctrines that
punish them for doing so. If we as a society are going to force
charities and the people they serve to fend for themselves, then we
have a moral, if not legal, obligation to get our legal system off their
backs.
I. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN
CONCEPTION OF CHARITY

A. Charity from Ancient Egypt to Elizabeth I
1. Charity As Love

According to the sociobiologist E.O. Wilson, "[g]enerosity without
hope of reciprocatioq is the rarest and most cherished of human
behaviors, subtle and difficult to define, ... surrounded by ritual and
circumstance, and honored by medallions and emotional orations." 8
Because such altruistic behavior confers certain evolutionary
advantages, it has become a selected and enduring trait in human
beings. 9 Recently published research on the human brain seems to
confirm that humans are wired to cooperate. 10
Historians trace the concept of charity to civilizations that existed
long before the birth of Christ. As early as 1300 B.C., ancient
Egyptian civilization included the concept of "Maat," which implied
social justice and righteous dealings with one's fellow man. 11
Egyptians were buried with records of the "blessed giving[s]" they had
8. Edward 0. Wilson, On Human Nature 155 (1978).
9. See id. at 159.
10. See Natalie Angier, Why We're So Nice: We're Wired to Cooperate, N.Y.
Times, July 23, 2002, at Fl ( describing research in which MRI technology shows that
selfless acts of cooperation stimulate important pleasure centers in the brain).
11. Gladstone, supra note 7, at 10.
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shared with the poor during their lifetimes. 12 "In Early Mesopotamia,
the Code of Hammurabi instructed Babylonians to protect the less
fortunate and to care for the poor, widowed and orphaned." 13
Buddhism, founded in 400 B.C., taught that love and charity were
paramount virtues. 14 In Hindu scriptures, giving to the needyparticularly holy men dependent on alms-was a duty and could
reward the donor in a future existence. 15
The Anglo-American tradition of charity has Ancient Hebrew
roots. Hebrew doctrine taught that providing for the needy was an
essential part of a just society, and that not only did humans have a
moral obligation to aid those in need, but those in need had a moral
obligation to accept assistance. 16 Judaism made tithing compulsory,
along with giving bread to the hungry, taking outcasts into the home,
and clothing the naked. 17 Early Judaism stressed that a principal
function of the synagogue was to organize charitable giving. 18 The
Jewish notion of charity was bound up closely with the idea of love, 19
and a fundamental principal of the Torah is the command to love thy
neighbor as thyself. 20
Judaism was seminal to the early Christian concept of charity,2 1 and
it was through Christianity that the concept of charity became
cemented in Anglo-American culture and law. 22 As Christianity
12. Penina Kessler Lieber, 1601-2001: An Anniversary of Note, 62 U. Pitt. L. Rev.
731, 732 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).
13. Id.; see Trattner, supra note 7, at 1; Stephen R. Block, A History of the
Discipline, in The Nonprofit Organization: Essential Readings 46 (David L. Gies et.
al. eds., 1990).
14. Trattner, supra note 7, at 1.
15. Merle Curti, Philanthropy, in The Nonprofit Organization:
Essential
Readings, supra note 13, at 339.
16. Trattner, supra note 7, at 2; Curti, supra note 15, at 340; see Robert L. Payton,
A Tradition in Jeopardy, in Philanthropy and the Nonprofit Sector in a Changing
America 482 (Charles T. Clotfelter & Thomas Ehrlich eds., 1999) (indicating that the
oldest books of the Old Testament include mandates to aid widows, orphans,
strangers, and the poor).
17. Curti, supra note 15, at 340 (citing Isiah 58:7).
18. Id. at 340-41.
19. Gladstone, supra note 7, at 9, 15. The word charity derives from the Latin
caritas, itself a translation of the Greek agape. Agape was the word chosen around
200 B.C. by the first translators of the Old Testament to represent the Hebrew hab, or
love. Many stories of the Old Testament illustrate the importance of love and mercy.
20. Id. at 18 (noting that the Jewish conception of charity is bound up with the
notion of combating injustice).
21. Curti, supra note 15, at 341.
22. See Gladstone, supra note 7, at 20. I do not mean to argue that AngloAmerican charity is an exclusively Christian phenomenon. In his important work on
American philanthropy, Robert Bremner offers the droll observation that the first
philanthropists in the New World were the Native Americans who aided the
struggling Pilgrims. Robert H. Bremner, American Philanthropy 5 (1960). Islam has
also influenced this country's culture since before its founding, not least through the
spiritual convictions of the Muslim men and women from Africa who were taken to
this continent against their will. Anyone interested in the future of charity in this
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spread rapidly across the Roman Empire in its waning days, the
"'practical application of charity was probably the most potent single
cause of Christian success."' 23 The Roman Emperor Constantine
converted to Christianity around 311 A.O. and he supported the
church's practical charitable work by assigning a fixed and generous
proportion of provincial revenues to church charity. 24
Early Christianity had a very particular view of its meaning. Jesus
taught that love, mercy, and justice should be written on people's
hearts, even if not necessarily in their laws. 25 His followers were
obliged to love their enemies, practice good deeds, offer alms
generously, and thereby gain entrance into heaven. 26 In the early
Christian view, the giving of alms was a spiritual rather than a social
act, one that could bring the donor closer to a union with God. 27 The
effect of charitable acts on the giver's soul was doctrinally more
significant than the effects on the body of the recipient. 28 If Christians
in those days had any thoughts about eliminating the underlying
causes of poverty, they probably would have opposed the notion, for if
there were no poor, there would be no means by which the fortunate
could buy divine grace. 29 By the fourth century, the concept of charity
was well established in Christendom, but it had little to do with
preventing poverty; it was about almsgiving in the face of perpetual
and unavoidable need. 30
It is significant for our purposes that the early Christian tradition
assumed that poverty and need arose as part of God's plan for
mortals, and that it was just and proper for individuals within society
to assume responsibility for the attendant suffering. 31 Individuals
were afflicted by poverty as a result of God's plan, not because they
necessarily deserved to suffer. It followed that poverty and begging of
alms could not be moral failings, and by no means could they be
considered crimes. 32 Followers were obliged to identify and address

country should take into account Islam's growing influence within our borders. Like
Judaism and Christianity, Islam places strong emphasis on giving to the poor and
powerless, and almsgiving is one of its five pillars. See Approaching the Qur'ran: The
Early Revelations 38 (Michael Sells trans., 1999).
23. Gladstone, supra note 7, at 27 (quoting H. Chadwick, The Early Church 56
(1967)).
24. See id.
25. Id. at 22.
26. Comm'n on Private Philanthropy & Pub. Needs, supra note 2, at 62 (referring
to this doctrine as "salvation at a price"); Wagner, supra note 6, at 82 (stating that in
early Christian doctrine, an "alms giver could become 'God's creditor'").
27. Curti, supra note 15, at 341.
28. B. Kirkman Gray, A History of English Philanthropy, vii (1905).
29. Wagner, supra note 6, at 82.
30. Id. See generally Curti, supra note 15.
31. See Trattner, supra note 7, at 4.
32. Id.
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the needs of the poor without regard to their attractiveness or
deservedness. 33
After the fall of the Roman Empire, England and parts of Europe
experienced a long period in which no state and no secular institution
was equipped to provide relief for the poor and distressed. The
Church of Rome became the primary front of charitable work in
Europe and over time institutionalized its doctrine of love for fellow
men by creating (and encouraging gifts for) monasteries, charitable
hospitals, and colleges, all dedicated to serving God by providing for
the poor. 34 By the sixth century and throughout most of the early
Middle Ages in England, Catholic monasteries were the centers of
practical charity, relieving poverty, tending the sick, and providing
education. 35
By the eleventh century, as feudalism became the dominant mode
of social organization in England, landed nobles began to take on-at
least in theory-responsibility for caring for their needy subjects in
exchange for loyalty, agricultural labor, and a willingness to fight
under the lord's banner in the period's endless private and public
wars. 36 In the following centuries, cities, towns, and guilds also began
to take a role in poor relief. 37 However, monasteries, with their
Christian view of charity, remained the primary institutional vehicles
for providing aid to the sick and poor from medieval times up until the
Protestant Reformation.
2. The Origins of English Charity Laws
The thirteenth and fourteenth centuries in England were a time of
transition in the law and culture of charity. Although most organized
charity still took place under the aegis of the Church of Rome and its
monasteries, budding medieval states began to intervene through the
institution of the law. England's early legislative efforts were
intended solely to control begging and prevent vagrancy, problems
that were only beginning to appear on a significant scale.38 A typical
effort was the Ordinance of Laborers in 1349, which attempted among
other things to force both laborers and the unemployed poor to
remain within their home districts and to work for whoever would hire

33. See Gladstone, supra note 7, at 30.
34. See Curti, supra note 15, at 342-43 (adding that during this time much of the
charity was "impulsive, indiscriminate, and perfunctory").
35. E.M. Leonard, The Early History of English Poor Relief 4 (2d ed. 1965);
Trattner, supra note 7, at 4; see Wagner, supra note 6, at 85 (adding that medieval
monasteries were centers of radical thought and often at odds with the mother
church).
36. Trattner, supra note 7, at 4. See generally Jonathan Sumption, The Hundred
Years War: Trial by Battle (1990).
37. Leonard, supra note 35, at 7.
38. Id. at 3.
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them. 39 It also limited private giving on the theory that so-called
"promiscuous alms" would encourage sloth and licentiousness. 40
These restrictions were further elaborated in the Act of 1388, which
not only forbade the movement of beggars and laborers but went a
step further by requiring all commoners to obtain letters of permission
before leaving their local districts. 41 Those caught without letters were
to be placed in stocks, which seems a harsh punishment until
compared to the abuse doled out to the English poor in the following
centuries. 42
Crude as they were, these early English acts contained seeds of
future Anglo-American laws governing charity. They represented the
first attempts to weed out able-bodied or "sturdy" beggars, who were
considered unworthy of charity. 43 They also were harbingers of the
growing belief that poverty was a personal failing that could justly be
remedied by controlling and punishing the poor. 44
As English authorities undertook these simple attempts to legislate
against poverty and its effects, society's definition of charity began to
shift. Where it had once meant ecclesiastical attempts to purify men's
hearts by ministering to the needs of the poor, it now began to imply a
sort of social engineering. For the first time, it appeared that the
emerging nation-state might have a legitimate role in controlling
poverty and, at least indirectly, administering charity. Thus began a
long, slow process-one that continues to this day-of tugging charity
away from its ecclesiastical roots.
3. Charity as Social Engineering
Histories of Anglo-American charity and the laws that regulate it
often begin in the year 1601 with the passage of Queen Elizabeth's
Poor Laws and Statute of Charitable Uses. 45 But those laws were in
reality a mere reflection and culmination of gradual, fundamental
changes in the cultural and legal definition of charity that took place
during the sixteenth century in England. 46 To pinpoint the origins of
America's present legal difficulties, we must go back a bit further than
1601, to the early and mid-1500s when two historic developments
helped establish a new cultural and legal definition of charity.
The first was King Henry VIIl's (r. 1509-1547) disagreement with
the Church of Rome over his desire to divorce Catherine of Aragon
39. Trattner, supra note 7, at 8.
40. Leonard supra note 35, at 3; Trattner, supra note 7, at 7-8.
41. Leonard, supra note 35, at 5.
42. See id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See infra notes 73-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Statute of
Charitable Uses.
46. See Gray, supra note 28, at 43; Trattner, supra note 7, at 10.
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and marry Anne Boleyn. When the Church of Rome, in the person of
Pope Clement VI, refused to grant Henry's annulment and bless his
second marriage, Henry responded in 1536 by establishing his own
more compliant church, the Church of England, and seizing all
ecclesiastical property in his domains, including the thousands of
monasteries that formerly had ministered to the poor.47 The
recipients of Church of Rome properties, both ecclesiastical and lay,
were generally bound by the terms of the Crown's grants to continue
the charity work that had taken place on the property, but in practice
these pledges were often ignored.48
The second, coincidental historical trend that helped sow the seeds
of modern charity was the shift from feudal social organization to
mercantile capitalism. 49 The mid-sixteenth century in England was a
time of social and economic upheaval. To condense several centuries
of gradual historical change into one paragraph, the wool production
in Europe's Low Countries became a center of industrial
development, and the feudal lords of England realized that they could
create greater personal wealth by fencing, or "enclosing," their vast
domains to create sheep pasturage rather than by maintaining leagues
of peasants to cultivate the land and create agricultural surplus. The
result of the so-called "enclosure movement" was to throw the
peasants off of the land on which they subsisted, forcing many to
migrate to urban centers where, not incidentally, mercantile industries
were taking shape and looking for labor.so In the social dislocation
caused by this economic transformation, many poor were left without
land to grow crops or wages with which to buy food. Poverty and the
social ills that attend it-vagrancy, begging, crime-skyrocketed and
laws intended to manage or control poverty multiplied.s 1
Thus, in Henry VIII's England, poverty was increasing dramatically
just as he was destroying the Catholic monasteries that acted as the
nation's primary institutions of poor relief.s 2 His Reformation swept
47. David C. Hammack, Introduction to Making the Nonprofit Sector in the
United States 3-4 (David C. Hammack ed., 1998) [hereinafter The Nonprofit Sector].
48. Gray, supra note 28, at 11.
49. Samuel Mencher, Poor Law to Poverty Program: Economic Security Policy in
Britain and the United States 3 (1967) (arguing that the origins of modem
philanthropy are in the rise of mercantilism in the mid-sixteenth century); Curti, supra
note 15, at 342 (arguing philanthropy grew from the death of feudalism, the rise of
cities and a middle class, dislocation of population due to the enclosure movement,
and the Reformation itself); see also Hammack, supra note 47, at 9.
50. See Mencher, supra note 49, at 9. Most of those who found wage labor
continued in poverty. It was an accepted tenet of the classical economic theory of the
early mercantile period that wages be kept at subsistence levels, not (at least in
theory) to maximize profits, but rather to prevent laborers from attempting to
accumulate capital, thereby rising above their station and disrupting the hierarchical
social system that God had ordained.
51. See Leonard, supra note 35, at 11-13; see also Gray, supra note 28, at 3-6 ("The
sheep farmers and enclosers acted promptly, the habits of a people alter but slowly.").
52. See Gray, supra note 28, at 9.
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away the church-centered welfare system, and attempted to fill the
void with a more secular brand of philanthropy and state regulation. 53
Charity, which formerly had been grounded in the Roman Catholic
values of love and compassion, mercy and forgiveness, now also would
be controlled by the values of the s'tate and its state-sponsored
religion. 54 Given the economic trends the state was being forced to
grapple with, its values were focused on creating social order, not
alleviating suffering out of a sense of love and compassion and a
desire to please the Lord. 55 At the same time, the state-sponsored
Protestantism that was taking hold in England placed greater
emphasis than the Church of Rome on asceticism, self-reliance, the
primacy of work, and the notion that poverty was a sign of God's
disfavor. 56 For charity and for the poor that relied on it, significant
changes were in the offing.
4. The Evolving Law of Charity
England's intervention in the realm of charity took place gradually
over more than two hundred years and included a long series of edicts
and parliamentary acts. For the sake of brevity, we will condense that
history into a few pages, focusing particular attention on those
developments that laid the foundation for our current, divided
American cultural and legal definition of charity.
The first of Henry's acts that established the template for later
charity law was a 1531 Act which was intended to address the growing
problem of poverty. 57 It commanded sheriffs and justices of the peace
in the realm to identify the deserving poor in their districts and issue
to them what amounted to licenses to beg within limited geographic
limits. According to this Act, the able-bodied who sought alms were
to be punished by whipping, and those who gave alms to the ablebodied were to be fined. 58 By its own terms, the Act was intended to
limit the number of beggars, not to provide relief to the poor.
The first act failed at both relieving poverty and controlling its
consequences, and thus led to the second significant charity act of
Henry's reign, which commanded his subjects to, among other things,
put the "sturdy poor" to work and bind vagrant children into
apprenticeships. 59 As to those who were legitimately "impotent," a
system was established by which alms were to be placed in a common
box at each parish of the Church of England and then distributed by
53. Gladstone, supra note 7, at 37-38.
54. See id. at 38.
55. See Gareth Jones, History of the Law Of Charity 1532-1827, at 10 (1969).
56. Gurin & Van Ti!, supra note 2, at 5; see Mencher, supra note 49, at 6 (arguing
that during the mercantile period work became man's duty before God).
57. 22 Hen. 8, c. 12 (1531) (Eng.); see supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
58. Leonard, supra note 35, at 54; see also Gray, supra note 28, at 32.
59. 27 Hen. 7, c. 25 (1536) (Eng.); see also Leonard, supra note 35, at 54-56.
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parish authorities to the truly needy. 60 Again, private alms were
forbidden for fear they would encourage idleness and vagrancy. 61 This
second act introduced into the Anglo-American law of charity the
idea of putting the poor to work; however, it gave no guidance as to
how that task was to be carried out, and for that reason was largely
ineffectual. Still, when taken together, Henry's two acts represented
the first time the state had taken a significant role in administering
charity or poor relief:'62 and, more important for our purposes, it
implanted the notion in the Anglo-American legal and cultural
tradition that proving or requiring work was a valid response to
poverty and suffering.
If Henry's reign introduced the notion that the state should use a
stick as the primary means of addressing poverty, the idea was
stretched to extremes during the brief reign of Henry's son, Edward
VI (r. 1547-1553). Finding that Henry's strictures had not stemmed
the tide of poverty and begging, in 1547, the first year of young
Edward's reign, an act was passed providing for, among other things,
the enslavement of sturdy beggars for a term of two years. 63 If the
enslaved subjects ran away and were captured, they would be
enslaved for life. 64 The sons of vagrants could be removed from their
parents and apprenticed until they reached the age of twenty-four,
daughters until the age of twenty. 65 The enslavement laws lasted for
only two years, at which time whipping was reintroduced, but by that
time it had been well established that the state's intervention in the
realm of charity would be guided by principles other than
compassionate benevolence. 66
As the problems of poverty and vagrancy grew and social stability
was further threatened, legislative acts multiplied. During the reign of
Elizabeth I (r. 1558-1603) the Act Concerning Poverty was horridly
harsh in its efforts to suppress vagrancy. 67 Penalties under the Act

60. See Trattner, supra note 7, at 9.
61. Leonard, supra note 35, at 55 (noting that noblemen, abbots, and friars were
exempted from the limits on almsgiving).
62. See id.; see also Mencher, supra note 49, at 26.
63. Leonard, supra note 35, at 56-57 (citing 1 Edw. 6, c. 3 (1547) (Eng.)).
64. Id. at 56.
65. Id.
66. See id. at 56-57.
67. 14 Eliz., c. 5 (1572) (Eng.); see also Leonard, supra note 35, at 70. Today, this
Act is most often referred to because its efforts to define the problem of poverty are
amusing to contemporary ears. For example, it famously included within its
definition of vagrants "scholars of Oxford and Cambridge who beg without being
licensed by Chancellor or Vice-Chancellor." Id. It was also notable for our purposes
because of the controversy it caused by proscribing travel by "minstrels, bearwards,
etc." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). After contentious debate, the House of
Commons worked out a compromise that permitted this class to wander but only after
obtaining a license from two separate justices of the peace. It was an early example of
an Anglo-American legislative body having to choose between poverty regulation and
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included whipping and boring through the ear for the first offense,
conviction of a felony for the second offense, and, with certain
exceptions, death for the third offense. 68
Elizabeth's Act of 1572 was also remarkable in that it represented a
first attempt by the English government to establish a comprehensive
system of poor relief. The law commanded justices of the peace to
create registries of their districts' deserving poor and identify
habitations that could accommodate them. They also were to weed
out poor strangers and send them to their home districts. Once the
list of legitimate local poor was completed, local officials were to
estimate the expense of aiding them, and tax the district's inhabitants
accordingly. 69 By the time of this act, the state had clearly abandoned
the notion that giving to the poor should be voluntary and for the
metaphysical benefit of the donor. Charity had come over to the
state, and now would be characterized by social engineering,
compulsion, and work. 70
The Elizabethan laws that followed represented elaborations on the
general theme of forcing work upon the poor. The Act of 157571
offered a first, tentative solution to the problem of providing work for
the "sturdy poor" rather than simply whipping, jailing, or enslaving
them. It required each city and town to provide a stack of wool,
hemp, iron, or other raw material for labor for the idle. It also
required the establishment of houses of correction where those
unwilling to work could be sent. 72
Such was the state of English law when the Statute of Charitable
Uses and the Poor Laws were debated and passed in 1601. The Poor
Laws were no more than a summation of the cultural and legal
developments represented by the various acts of the previous century,
discussed above. 73 The crux was to enable public relief for the
deserving poor, largely by forcing them to work. 74
The Statute of Charitable Uses, passed in the same year, was
intended to enable private charitable efforts by legally defining the
concept of charity. The Statute's most recognizable and oft-quoted
feature, its preamble, listed the charitable activities, or uses that the
law would accept. 75 They included:
commerce and coming down, at least largely, on the side of commerce. We shall see
this legislative choice repeated later in mid-1800s America.
68. Leonard, supra note 35, at 70.
69. Id. at 71.
70. See id. at 72.
71. 18 Eliz., c. 3 (1575) (Eng.).
72. Id.
73. Cf Gray, supra note 28, at 43; Trattner, supra note 7, at 10.
74. See Trattner, supra note 7, at 11.
75. Gladstone, supra note 7, at 40 (arguing the preamble to the Statute of
Charitable Uses "exercised a profound effect on later development[s] of the legal
meaning of charity").
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[S]ome for relief of aged, impotent and poor people, some for
maintenance of sick and maimed soldiers and mariners, schools of
learning, free schools, and scholars in universities, some for repair of
bridges, ports, havens, causeways, churches, sea-banks, and
highways, some for education and preferment of orphans, some for
or towards relief, stock or maintenance for houses of correction,
some for marriages of poor maids, some for supportation, aid and
help of young tradesmen, handicraftsmen and persons decayed, and
others for relief or redemption of prisoners or captives, and for aid
or ease of any poor inhabitants concerning payments of fifteens,
setting out of soldiers and other taxes; ... " 76

The Statute of Charitable Uses remained good law for well over a
century77 and to this day is considered by many as the starting point of
the modern Anglo-American law of charity. 78 As such, it is
worthwhile to examine some of its features.
First, the language of the Statute made plain that spirituality and
religion were no longer at the heart of the legal definition of charity.
The only glancing mention religion received was in the "repair of ...
churches." 79 It was not until many decades later, as the turmoil of the
Reformation faded into memory, that the English common law
definition of charity evolved to encompass religious uses. 80
The preamble to the Statute also confirmed that by 1601 charity had
turned sharply toward social engineering. It encouraged charitable
donors to consider the building of bridges, roads, and schools as
legitimate charitable purposes. Charity had evolved from a spiritually
charged activity to a more secular one, defined most broadly by the
76. 43 Eliz., c. 4 (1601) (Eng.).
77. For purposes of our inquiry, we need not trace English legal developments
beyond the Statute of Charitable Uses. However, for the curious, we can summarize
by saying that by 1736 there was a popular reaction in England against the steady
increase of charitable land holdings that developed under the Statute. Parliament in
that year passed the Mortmain Act, which, in essence, rendered most charitable
bequests void and gutted the Statute. After more than a century of confusing and
contradictory legal developments, Lord McNaughten brought some order back to the
law of charity by offering a new legal definition that was essentially a summary of and
slight elaboration upon the Statute. He declared that
"Charity" in its legal sense comprises four principal divisions: trusts for the
relief of poverty; trusts for the advancement of education; trusts for the
advancement of religion; and trusts for other purposes beneficial to the
community, not falling under any of the preceding heads. The Trusts last
referred to are not the less charitable in the eye of the law, because
incidentally they benefit the rich as well as the poor, as indeed, every charity
that deserves the name must do either directly or indirectly.
Comm'rs for Special Purposes of the Income Tax v. Pemsel, 1 AC. 531, 583 (H.L.
1891) (Lord McNaughten's judgment).
78. See David C. Hammack, The Statute of Charitable Uses, in Making the
Nonprofit Sector in the United States, supra note 47, at 5-6.
79. 43 Eliz., c. 4.
80. See Pemsel, l AC. at 531 (Lord McNaughten's judgment) (including religion
within the legal definition of charity).

2450

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73

"public benefit." 81 This was the beginning of the view, which later
would become a central tenet of Anglo-American charity law, that
donations for "public benefit" activities would be charitable, even if
that benefit was not focused on the poor and distressed.
Elizabeth's Statute and Poor Laws also represented the view, which
had developed over the preceding centuries in England, that poverty
was caused by immorality and sloth, and that it could be addressed by
requiring the poor to work. The various acts leading up to the 1601
legislation had vacillated over the proper level of cruelty with which to
treat vagrants and beggars, but these vacillations were merely over
degree. By 1601, there was no disagreement over the fact that some
were deserving of charity while others-chiefly those who were
considered "sturdy" - could rightly be left to starve if they refused to
work. 82
It is particularly significant for our purposes that the Statute's
strong legal and cultural predilection for work as a response to
poverty included the "aid and supportation of young tradesmen, [and]
handicraftsmen." 83 Expressed in modem terms, the 1601 English law
of charity approved of introducing the poor to the market and
encouraging them to work their own way out of poverty. 84 This notion
of commercial activity as a tool for alleviating poverty later took root
in America and, as we will discuss below, migrated to a central
position in the American culture and law of charity.
Before departing England and continuing our inquiry on the shores
of the New World, it is important to emphasize two aspects of the
history of late medieval charity that have reverberated through the
centuries. First, as a result of the Reformation and the poverty laws
that were passed under the reigns of Henry VIII, Edward VI, and
Elizabeth I, charity became identified with work and enterprise.
Second, although the pre-Reformation vulgar understanding of
charity began to give way to the social engineering view, the older
version never entirely disappeared. The Reformation and the various
legislative acts of late medieval England secularized charity and
reformed it into a mechanism for controlling poverty and pauperism,
but charity never completely shed its compassionate, spiritual
underpinnings. In spite of the broadening definition of charity, men
and women were still motivated to engage in charitable works and

81. See Gladstone, supra note 7, at 47 (arguing the Statute of Charitable Uses
made "public benefit" the key to the legal meaning of the term charity); Lieber, supra
note 12, at 734.
82. See Mencher, supra note 49, at xvi, 23, 33.
83. 43 Eliz., c. 4 (1601) (Eng.).
84. See Gray, supra note 28, at 18.
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leave charitable bequests in hopes of making right with their creator
and securing for themselves a comfortable place in the afterlife. 85

B. Charity Comes to America: From Cotton Mather to Scientific
Philanthropy, Work Becomes Charity's Dominant Ethos
1. Early Influences on American Charity: The Self-Help Tradition

and Ascetic Protestantism
Although it was clear from the start that the colonists would carry
their charitable traditions along with them from England to the New
World,86 it was just as clear that circumstances in the colonies would
lead to a particularly American version of charity, one that would
stress to an even greater extent than in England individual
responsibility, the primacy of work and, eventually, high tolerance for
blending charity and private enterprise.
Two aspects of life in the New World shaped the development of
American charity. First, New World communities came into existence
before strong governments. In America, if public needs, including the
needs of the destitute, were to be addressed at all, the communities
themselves would have to take care of them. 87 As the colonies
developed, and later as the American frontier opened up, the
tradition of self-help and caring for one's own-whether or not it
happened in fact- became a central and celebrated part of our
cultural narrative. 88
85. See Gladstone, supra note 7, at 170 ( arguing " [c]harity in this broad sense'love thy neighbour as thyself' -remains a powerful if often unconscious influence
even in these secular times ... there abides a certain fascination and respect for the
principle of equal and unconditional concern for the welfare of every fellow human
being"); Gray, supra note 28, at vii, 41-42 (arguing the old Judeo-Christian
motivations for charity did not disappear with the Reformation).
86. See Trattner, supra note 7, at 30 (noting that by 1691 Boston had four full-time
overseers of the poor); Fishman, supra note 4, at 623 (some of the first state
constitutions drawn up after the Revolution, including Massachusetts's, provided "[i]t
shall be the duty of legislatures and magistrates, in all future periods of this
Commonwealth ... to countenance and inculcate the principles of humanity and
general benevolence, public and private charity ... and all social affections, and
generous sentiments among the people"); Lieber, supra note 12, at 735 (noting that, in
1620, before landing at Plymouth, forty-one passengers on the Mayflower signed the
Mayflower Compact "expressing their commitment to provide for the common
good").
87. See Lieber, supra note 12, at 734-35. In a related point, because the colonies
lacked the feudal paternalism that colored England's sense of social responsibility, the
poor of the New World were-to a degree even greater than in England-left out in
the cold to either find work or starve. See Mencher, supra note 49, at 40-41.
88. See Lieber, supra note 12, at 735. A close corollary of this celebration of selfhelp was the central position of volunteerism in the American culture of charity. See
Gurin & Van Ti!, supra note 2, at 6. While opinions vary over whether the
combination of volunteerism and self-help are an effective strategy for dealing with
social needs, there can be little doubt that they lie at the heart of Americans'
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Second, the colonists' ascetic version of Protestantism had a strong
impact on charity in the New World. Although the various sects that
populated the colonies did not always agree on questions of religious
doctrine, 89 they shared beliefs about poverty and society's role in
alleviating it. Like pre-Reformation Christians, the Protestants of the
New World believed that misery and want were part of God's plan
and thus inevitable. 9° From there, however, their views diverged. In
contrast to pre-Reformation Christianity's emphasis on communing
with God by showing indiscriminate compassion toward the poor, the
Protestants of the New World tended toward the belief that wealth
was proof of goodness and selection by God, while poverty was
evidence of the opposite. 91 Each man was his own master under
God, 92 and each person's moral obligations were owed directly to Him
rather than to fellow man. Under these guiding beliefs, the religious
significance of charity faded somewhat. 93
In keeping with their beliefs about individual responsibility under
the eyes of God, the colonists believed that the state and society had
limited responsibility to provide for the welfare of individuals. 94
These views were reflected in the writings of the great proponents and
spokespersons of American charity. Cotton Mather, for example,
who preached to the Massachusetts Bay Colony in the seventeenth
century, was the main colonial exponent of "do-goodism." 95 He held
that all highborn individuals had a responsibility to undertake
voluntary acts of charity, not as a means of salvation, but as a religious
obligation owed to the God who had already selected them for
salvation. 96 He vigorously inveighed against unwise bestowal of alms
lest they should encourage indolence on the part of the recipients. 97
Mather is remembered for scolding nostrums that helped define core
concepts of American charity. Notably, he insisted that God intended
the poor to work and that those who were able but refused should be
left to starve. 98

conception of charity. See Gary N. Scrivner, 100 Years of Tax Policy Changes
Affecting Charitable Organizations, in The Nonprofit Organization: Essential
Readings, supra note 13, at 127 (arguing that "[c]itizens combating problems and
reaching solutions on a collective basis, in associations, is inherent in the very nature
of American societal structure").
89. See David C. Hammack, Colonial Reality: Religious Diversity, in The
Nonprofit Sector, supra note 47, at 37.
90. Trattner, supra note 7, at 38.
91. Mencher, supra note 49, at 43.
92. Id. at 62.
93. See id.
94. See id. at 40.
95. See Bremner, supra note 22, at 11.
96. See Trattner, supra note 7, at 12.
97. See Bremner, supra note 22, at 12-14.
98. See Trattner, supra note 7, at 22.
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Benjamin Franklin's writings also exerted influence over the
development of American charity. His historical legacy has become
closely identified with volunteerism and self-help, partly as a result of
the many voluntary organizations he formed in Philadelphia, including
the nation's first volunteer firehouse and the Junto Society, which,
among other things, helped young men establish themselves in private
enterprise. 99 Franklin was harshly critical of social welfare systems
that provided handouts to the poor. Visiting England in 1776, he said
that their system, which was still based on the Elizabethan Poor Law,
caused the poor to be "idle, dissolute, drunken and insolent." 100
Franklin introduced a more secular tinge to Mather's do-good gospel,
nudging to the center of American charity the notion that industry
and hard work were the only legitimate responses to want, and that
charity should be limited to driving the poor out of poverty. 101
After the Revolution, American charity continued to focus on
finding work for the poor, but there was a slight change in the
philosophical justification of why this was the proper course. The
Enlightenment, with its belief in rationality and boundless progress,
wore away the grim determinism of Calvinist Protestantism and
pushed aside the notion that misery and want were inevitable. It
challenged the American public to do something to help the poor. 102
At the same time, Enlightenment thinking supported the idea - by
now a settled aspect of the American charitable tradition- that the
poor were responsible for their own plight. 103 After all, in a land rich
in natural resources and opportunity, what other than sloth and moral
decrepitude could explain an individual's failure to prosper? 104
The result was a vast increase in nineteenth-century America of the
number of organizations devoted to combating poverty, with most of
them determined to carry out their missions by offering spiritual
counseling and, foremost, by putting people to work. 105
2. The Era of Friendly Visitors and Scientific Philanthropy
The mid-nineteenth century was the beginning of the era of the
"friendly visitor" or "friendly advice" in America that offered the

99. See generally Benjamin Franklin, Autobiography: Recollections of InstitutionBuilding, 1771-84, in Hammack, The Nonprofit Sector, supra note 47, at 71, 74-75.
100. Mencher, supra note 49, at 96.
101. Bremner, supra note 22, at 17.
102. Trattner, supra note 7, at 38.
103. Id. at 54.
104. See Mencher, supra note 49, at 144; Trattner, supra note 7, at 43 (arguing the
tendency to equate charity with work was encouraged by the exploration and settling
of the American West, which was propelled by a cultural creed of independence, selfhelp, and personal achievement).
105. See Mencher, supra note 49, at 144, 148; Trattner, supra note 7, at 43; Wagner,
supra note 6, at 52.
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poor "no alms, but sympathy and counsel." 106 In the view of the
friendly visitors, since poverty was a personal failing that resulted
from moral weakness, the solution was a friend from the middle class
who would instruct the unfortunate in the ways of clean, upright,
prosperous living. 107 The friendly visitors were in the business of
building character, not necessarily relieving need. 108 Money was not
to change hands. 109
Josephine Shaw, who in the late nineteenth century was famous as a
fierce proponent of the concept of friendly visiting, expressed the
visitors' fixation on work when she declared that "the world [is] made
of two classes: workers and idlers." 110 She and the friendly visitors
would provide structure and guidance for the former, while the latter,
as Cotton Mather preached in colonial days, could be left to starve.11 1
The stingy benevolence 112 of the friendly visitor movement and
general focus on work as the core of American charity and
philanthropy was interrupted during the Civil War years. Warnings
about unwise giving of promiscuous alms were forgotten in the face of
widespread suffering and need. 113 During the war the central
government became more involved in poverty relief and the
experience encouraged the view that its presence was necessary to
achieve meaningful social welfare. 114
However, the wartime
generosity brought increased public debt and higher taxes, which
caused a backlash of hostility to public poor relief in the postwar
years. 115
The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw the rise of socalled "scientific philanthropy." Aside from its name, there was
nothing particularly new about scientific philanthropy. Benjamin
Franklin had preached a similar message 150 years earlier. 116
However, because the "scientific" approach was espoused by the
omnipotent robber barons of the day, it became the dominant ethos in
turn-of-the-century and early-twentieth-century American charity.
"Rags-to-riches" had become a popular cultural narrative in the
United States as men like Andrew Carnegie and John D. Rockefeller
amassed fortunes that would have been unimaginable a generation
106. Trattner, supra note 7, at 69.
107. Bremner, supra note 22, at 99-100 (arguing the "friendly visitor" notion was
founded on a conviction of superiority).
108. Id. at 100.
109. See Wagner, supra note 6, at 48.
110. Bremner, supra note 22, at 97.
111. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
112. See Trattner, supra note 7, at 100 (arguing the friendly visitors were stingy in
that they ignored empirical evidence that showed that poverty resulted from
accidents, sickness, and market fluctuations, not from indolence).
113. Bremner, supra note 22, at 75; Trattner, supra note 7, at 77.
114. Trattner, supra note 7, at 81.
115. Bremner, supra note 22, at 76-88.
116. See id. at 89-104; see also supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
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earlier. 117 Steeped in Social Darwinism, they believed it was a waste
of time to defy the evolutionary process by supporting the weaker of
the species, 118 those who in earlier generations would have been
referred to as the "undeserving," "idle," or "sturdy" poor. Although
Carnegie and his brethren recognized that the state bore some
responsibility for caring for the destitute and helpless, they firmly
believed that the philanthropy of the wealthy should focus on the able
and the industrious.11 9 Carnegie himself was contemptuous of
sentimental alms giving, 120 specifically rejecting the notion that
anything valuable could be accomplished by imitating the life or
methods of Christ, 121 and believing that "the best means of benefiting
the community is to place within its reach the ladders upon which the
aspiring can rise." 122 In the view of Carnegie and the other scientific
philanthropists, rationality, efficiency, foresight, and planning were
middle-class virtues that had proved their worth in the realm of forprofit enterprise, and now it was time to apply those same virtues in
the realm of charity. 123 In an articulation of charity that would
resurface forcefully a century later, Carnegie demanded to know
whether proposed recipients of aid would make good investment
vehicles. 124
Along with the rise of scientific philanthropy came a related but less
noticed trend in American charity. To a degree that had not
previously been evident, the idea of engaging in and encouraging
commerce was accepted as part of a broadening definition of
charity. 125 In many states, there developed a high tolerance for
business methods and commercial strategies among charities. 126 For
example, an 1888 tort case from Pennsylvania addressed the question
of whether a fire patrol that benefited the public but was funded and
motivated by the commercial interests of fire insurance companies
could be considered charitable. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
began its analysis by examining a traditional definition of charity: "It
is whatever is given for the love of God, or for the love of your
117. Trattner, supra note 7, at 95.
118. See Bremner, supra note 22, at 103; see also Peter Dobkin Hall, Inventing the
Nonprofit Sector and Other Essays on Philanthropy, Volunteerism, and Nonprofit
Organizations 121 (1992) (arguing that modern philanthropy was born when Social
Darwinism, industrial wealth, and academic expertise came together in the 1890s).
119. Bremner, supra note 22, at 105-21; see also Charles T. Clotfelter & Thomas
Ehrlich, The World We Must Build, in Philanthropy and the Nonprofit Sector in a
Changing America, supra note 16, at 501.
120. Bremner, supra note 22, at 108.
121. Id. at 107.
122. Hall, supra note 118, at 45.
123. See Trattner, supra note 7, at 94.
124. Hall, supra note 118, at 118.
125. See Norman I. Silber, A Corporate Form of Freedom: The Emergence of the
Modern Nonprofit Sector 47 (2001).
126. Id. at 45.
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neighbor, in the catholic and universal sense; given from these
motives, and to those ends, free from the stain or taint of every
consideration that is personal, private, or selfish. " 127 The court
concluded, however, that such Christian purity of heart was not a
necessary element of American charity, and that the fire insurance
companies' commercial motivations were beside the point, so long as
their activity was benefiting the public at large. 128
In an oft-cited case from 1899, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
was asked to decide whether a home for aged and disabled men
qualified for property tax purposes as charitable where it paid for its
operations-including a mortgage note and superintendents'
salaries-by purchasing firewood, requiring residents to turn it into
kindling, and then selling it for a profit. 129 The court had no trouble
finding that "[w]here the objects and purposes of the institution are
wholly charitable, with no element of private gain, the receipt of
compensation from those who enjoy the benefits do not affect its
charitable nature." 130
In Massachusetts, the Supreme Judicial Court was called upon in
1905 to decide whether a home for young workingwomen was
charitable where it rented its rooms to the young women at moderate
cost. 131 The court pointed directly to the "supportation, aid and help
of young tradesmen" language in the preamble to the Statute of
Charitable Uses 132 in deciding that launching young women into
employment was a charitable purpose, even where they were paying
nominal rent to cover the costs of the charitable operation. 133
Beginning in the late 1800s and continuing through the roaring
decade of the 1920s it became increasingly acceptable in the eyes of
127. Fire Ins. Patrol v. Boyd, 15 A. 553, 554 (Pa. 1888).
128. See id. at 555-56; see also Trs. of Ky. Female Orphan Sch. v. Louisville, 36 S.W.
921, 923 (Ky. 1896) (charity does not lose its character as such if it receives revenue
from the recipients of its bounty sufficient to keep it in operation); Contributors to
Pa. Hosp. v. Delaware County, 32 A. 456, 457 (Pa. 1895) (holding that a convalescent
farm used by a hospital is charitable and thus exempt from property tax even though
the farm produces a profit for the hospital); Trs. of Acad. of Protestant Episcopal
Church v. Taylor, 25 A. 55, 57 (Pa. 1892) (holding that the definition of "charity,"
which had been steadily broadening, now included a school open to the public that
charged students enough to maintain itself in operation); House of Refuge v. Smith,
21 A. 353, 354 (Pa. 1891) (holding juvenile correction home charitable for property
tax purposes even though residents work at jobs that produce some income for
organization).
129. Patterson Rescue Mission v. High, 44 A. 974, 974-75 (N.J. 1899).
130. Id. at 975.
131. Franklin Square House v. Boston, 74 N.E. 675, 675 (Mass. 1905).
132. See supra note 76.
133. Read v. Tidewater Coal Exch., Inc., 116 A. 898 (Del. Ch. 1922) (finding a
trade association formed to move coal efficiently through tidewater ports charitable);
Franklin Square, 74 N.E. at 676; see also House of the Good Shepherd of Omaha v.
Bd. of Equalization (In re House of the Good Shepherd of Omaha), 203 N.W. 632
(Neb. 1925) (ruling a laundry that produces considerable revenue at a home for fallen
women is charitable).
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judges and policymakers for charity and enterprise to grow toward
one another. 134 This trend slowed with the onset of the Great
Depression, 135 but as we shall see, arose again in modern times and
has moved toward the core of American charity.
3. The Persistence of Charity as Love
We must once again pause to note that although the story of charity
in the New World was one of increasing insistence on work as a
solution for poverty and increasing acceptance of commerce as a tool
of charity, the old-world, pre-Reformation view of charity as Christian
love was also transported to America. During times of widespread
crisis and hardship, most notably the Civil War and the Great
Depression, compassion-based charity and "promiscuous almsgiving"
came back into style, if only temporarily. 136 Even in times of peace
and relative prosperity there was a consistent hum of criticism of
scientific philanthropy and the "work or starve" social engineering
conception of charity from clergy who insisted that Christ demanded
uncalculating brotherly love from his servants. 137 In their view, the
spiritual aspects of charity, including the creation of a community of
feeling and a set of human bonds, were as significant as the charitable
service itself.138
Even outside the church there were signs that the older, preReformation, vulgar notions of charity were not completely swept
aside by the headlong rush to friendly visiting and scientific
philanthropy. For example, in the late 1800s, Clara Barton's work
forming the Red Cross focused on relieving suffering. She had little
interest in reforming charity or philanthropy to conform to
Enlightenment or Social-Darwinist views. 139
Likewise, the Settlement House movement that grew up around
Jane Addams at the turn of the twentieth century was largely a
negative reaction to the primacy of the social engineering, emotionally
and spiritually sterile "friendly visitor" movement and "scientific
philanthropy." 140 The goal of that movement was to address poverty
and its conditions, which alone did not distinguish it from "friendly
visiting." However, its doctrine and its methods were steeped in
spirituality and included goals of forming spiritual bonds and a sense

134. See Silber, supra note 125, at 47.
135. See id.
136. See supra notes 113, 135 and accompanying text.
137. See Hall, supra note 118, at 125.
138. Id. at 127.
139. See Bremner, supra note 22, at 90.
140. See Trattner, supra note 7, at 163. See generally Jane Addams, Twenty Years
at Hull-House (1910).
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of universal brotherhood between people of different stations. 141 Jane
Addams herself proudly admitted that the Settlement House
movement was based on spirituality and emotion as much as
conviction. 142
To take another, somewhat later example, the Catholic Worker
movement, founded by Dorothy Day in the early 1930s, focused on
poverty but clung always to a mission of doing God's work by building
a spiritual community that included both the poor and the powerful. 143
C. American Charity from the Great Depression to Ronald Reagan

During the Great Depression, alms to the poor and distressed again
became acceptable-as they had during the Civil War-in the face of
suffering that was so widespread it could not be explained as the result
of indolence or immorality. 144 Faced with the colossal need, it also
became evident to all that private philanthropy could not cope by
itself, notwithstanding Herbert Hoover's insistence to the contrary. 145
It thus became a broadly accepted view during the Depression that
private and public charity should both be encouraged and work in
concert. 146
This attitude of cooperation between government and private
actors helped fuel an explosion of charitable activity within the
nonprofit sector, 147 particularly after 1960. 148 A trend developed in
which the government used private charities to carry out its ambitious
New Deal, and later Great Society, social welfare plans. 149 The trend
continued into the 1970s, partly because of Americans' general
141. See Bremner, supra note 22, at 114 (noting that, like the "friendly visitors," the
Settlement House movement was based on class assumptions that the poor could be
ennobled by association with decent Americans of higher class and education); see
also Trattner supra note 7, at 183 (noting that the Settlement House movement, in
spite of its emotional and spiritual origins, included an emphasis on empirical
research, which ultimately helped dispel the notion that poverty was caused by
immorality, and helped demonstrate that intervention by the state could relieve
suffering. Many meaningful labor reforms, including child labor laws, grew out of the
Settlement movement).
142. See Bremner, supra note 22, at 114.
143. See generally Dorothy Day, The Long Loneliness: The Autobiography of
Dorothy Day (1952).
144. See Bremner, supra note 22, at 140; Comm'n on Private Philanthropy & Pub.
Needs, supra note 2, at 92 (noting "[t]he Depression ... shattered the myth that
private charity could tide the deserving poor over bad times"); Wagner, supra note 6,
at 66-67.
145. Trattner, supra note 7, at 276-77.
146. Id. at 214.
147. Hall, supra note 118, at 62-63.
148. Silber, supra note 125, at 143; see Bremner, supra note 22, at 201.
149. Kirsten A. Gr!Zlnbjerg & Lester M. Salamon, Devolution, Marketization, and
the Changing Shape of Government-Nonprofit Relations, in The State of Nonprofit
America, supra note 2, at 452 (arguing that most of the Great Society programs of the
1960s and 1970s operated with and through nonprofits).
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distrust of government as a result of Vietnam and Watergate, partly
because of a growing societal unhappiness with what was considered a
government-caused "welfare mess." 150
The new federalism that developed, in part to respond to this
general air of distrust, included Title XX of the Social Security
Amendments of 1974, which allowed states to use federal money to
fund whatever social services they thought appropriate. 151 State and
local governments rapidly expanded the use of "purchase of service
agreements" under which they paid private charities to carry out state
social welfare policy .152
This trend had an important formative effect on modern American
charity. One change, mentioned above, was the rapid expansion in
the number of nonprofit charities. 153 Another was an enormous
increase in the complexity of the charitable nonprofit sector. As
governments, the federal government in particular, became more
important sources of support for charitable nonprofits, they attached
regulations of Byzantine complexity to the grant of funds. Charities
were forced to expand their organizational capacities and technology
just to keep pace with government demands. By the 1980s, the
organizational technology of voluntary action, once fairly simple and
manageable, had by some accounts become a monopoly of the
articulate and highly educated. 154 For the first time in history, it
seemed that a successful manager of a charitable organization needed
to have an MBA or law degree just to understand the applicable
government regulations. 155
The years of the Reagan administration marked a new era in
charity, one that ultimately pushed the entire charitable sector in the
direction of the free market. There were two main causes of this shift:
First, the federal government under Reagan cut back on funds going
to charitable organizations; second, those funds that were earmarked
for charity were doled out using the supply-side schemes that the
administration applied to all social problems.
In earlier periods of American history, widespread economic
hardship usually had given rise to an expansion of the charitable
sector and a governmental and cultural support for funding charities
that addressed the suffering. 156 The Reagan years, however, were
marked by steep cuts in federal expenditures, including cuts in funds
150. Bremner, supra note 22, at 201.
151. Id. at 202.
152. Id.
153. See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
154. See Hall, supra note 118, at 8.
155. Charity workers in the United States had begun to seek professional status in
the early 1900s, around the time the academic disciplines of social work and sociology
were coming on the scene. Bremner, supra note 22, at 109; Trattner, supra note 7, at
234.
156. See supra notes 113, 135 and accompanying text.
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going to charitable nonprofit organizations, during times of recession
and mounting unemployment. 157 The Reagan administration cut the
federal government with evangelical zeal and rhetorically encouraged
the charitable nonprofit sector to take up the slack, but at the same
time it worked to cut government money going to that sector and to
reduce incentives for individuals and corporations to donate to it. 158
Under these conditions, many charitable nonprofit organizations
failed, 159 and those that survived did so by resorting increasingly to
entrepreneurial, market-oriented strategies. 160 The American law and
culture of charity had long ago begun permitting commercial activity
in support of charity, 161 but during the Reagan administration, for the
first time in U.S. history, law and policy converged to compel charities
to engage in commerce to survive.
Scarce funding was not the only factor pushing nonprofit
organizations toward the market. During the Reagan administration
many of the funding programs for social services were converted, in
accordance with the administration's supply-side preferences, from
grants and contracts for the benefit of charitable organizations to
vouchers and tax expenditures that channeled the increasingly scarce
available resources to the consumers of social services rather than the

157. Bremner, supra note 22, at 207.
158. Hall, supra note 118, at 80; see also Lester M. Salamon, Nonprofit
Organizations: The Lost Opportunity, in The Nonprofit Organization: The Essential
Readings, supra note 13, at 114 (arguing that Reagan had an opportunity to forge
stronger links with the nonprofit sector but failed and instead relied on exhortation
and on the assumption that his economic program would suffuse the country with
volunteer spirit; to accomplish this, the administration increased demands on the
nonprofit sector while decreasing revenues); Lester M. Salamon, The Resilient Sector:
The State of Nonprofit America, in The State of Nonprofit America, supra note 2, at
12-13 [hereinafter The Resilient Sector].
Salamon argues that the Reagan
administration attacked government spending in areas where charitable nonprofits
were most vulnerable-social and human services, education and training, community
development, and non-hospital health. Federal support outside of Medicare and
Medicaid declined by twenty-five percent in real dollar terms during the 1980s and
returned to 1980 levels only in the late 1990s; then, in 1994, the Contract With
America cut even more. Gr¢nbjerg & Salamon, supra note 149, at 447; The Resilient
Sector, supra, at 12-13. . Gr¢nbjerg and Salamon here argue that the government
funding that fueled the growth of the charitable nonprofit sector in the 1960s and
1970s declined in early 1980s in both absolute and constant terms, at least outside of
health care. By the 1990s, the real value of federal support to nonprofit organizations
was nineteen percent below its 1980 level in social services and education, forty-two
percent below in community development. Gr¢nbjerg & Salamon, supra note 149, at
447; Steven Rathgeb Smith, Social Services, in The State of Nonprofit America, supra
note 2, at 161 (arguing the Reagan administration's Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1981 cut spending and shifted spending decisions to the states, which in turn
cut funding to nonprofits, particularly in areas of legal aid, family planning, and
housing services).
159. Bremner, supra note 22, at 206.
160. Hall, supra note 118, at 80.
161. See supra notes 84, 125-33 and accompanying text.
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producers. 162 This meant that the charitable organizations were forced
to focus energy on marketing themselves and their services so that
they could compete effectively against rival nonprofits as well as an
increasing number of for-profit providers. 163
The charitable nonprofits often found that they had to compete
against for-profit firms where the for-profit providers had a clear
edge, 164 which in turn increased the ferocity with which the nonprofits
turned to the market. Charitable nonprofit organizations often lost
out in the supply-side free-for-all set up by the Reagan administration
policies, because for-profit firms were able to enter the social services
market and siphon off clients that were the least costly to treat,
leaving charitable nonprofits to handle the rest despite government
reimbursement rates that were insufficient to cover costs. 165
Charitable nonprofit organizations tended to react to this supply-side
competition by either folding or becoming more entrepreneurial and
commercial. 166
The Reagan revolution irrevocably changed the law and culture of
charity in the United States and in some respects exacerbated our
society's confused conception of charity's nature. Charity in this
country had always included such tenets as "work or starve," the
rejection of charity for the undeserving poor, and an acceptance of the
free-market and commercial activity as vehicles for achieving
charitable ends. However, the conservative political revolution
ushered in by Reagan brought those tenets to the core of our society's
conception of charity. At the same time as the Reagan administration
was forcing the commercialization of the nonprofit sector, its rhetoric
celebrated the older, compassionate, spiritually charged conception.
President Reagan offered a vision of society's poor and distressed
being tended to by compassionate private actors who would stoop
down to offer succor. He declared that "volunteerism is an essential
part of our plan to give the government back to the people. " 167 His
administration would restore the "American Spirit" of voluntary
162. See Salamon, The Resilient Sector, supra note 158, at 13.
163. Lester M. Salamon, Nonprofit Organizations: The Lost Opportunity, in The
Nonprofit Organization, supra note 13, at 122.
164. Id. at 16. For example, $2 billion in federal daycare subsidies were delivered
through a special childcare tax credit, so nonprofit daycare providers were thrown
into the private market to secure public money for their operations. They were
forced to focus on marketing and on mastering the complex billing and
reimbursement systems that had been more common in the for-profit world. This was
happening at a time of rapid technological development, when for-profits were better
able to acquire technology because they could more readily raise the necessary
capital. Id.
165. Grpnbjerg & Salamon, supra note 149, at 457.
166. See Heather Gottry, Note, Profit or Perish: Non-Profit Social Service
Organizations & Social Entrepreneurship, 6 Geo. J. on Poverty L. & Pol'y 249, 254-55
(1999).
167. Bremner, supra note 22, at 206.
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service and cooperation, of private and community initiative. 168 What
he would not do is pay to address the suffering that the well-meaning
volunteers failed to stem. 169
D. Where We Find Ourselves Now

Charity in the United States has undergone further transformation
in the last decade. As we have seen, there is nothing new about
insisting that charity be conducted with entrepreneurial zeal, about
offering work to the poor instead of alms, or about relying on marketoriented solutions to poverty. Cotton Mather believed in work for the
poor and the lash for the unwilling. Benjamin Franklin believed that
the proper role of charity was to show promising young men how to
become prosperous. State courts in America during the mid- and late
1800s became comfortable with blending charity and for-profit
enterprise. Andrew Carnegie insisted on all of the above, and that
charity be given only where its efficacy could be demonstrated
through scientific study. However, even with all of these historical
antecedents, it was not until recent decades that charity in our culture
became overwhelmingly and, it seems irrevocably, associated with
enterprise and commerce. Let us view the evidence of the turn that
charity has taken.
A glance at the nonprofit section of any local bookstore is
illuminating. Peons to the deeds of Mother Teresa and Dorothy Day,
proponents of the older, Christian love version of charity, have been
squeezed out by such titles as Venture Forth!: The Essential Guide to
Starting a Moneymaking Business in Your Nonprofit Organization, 170
Selling Social Change (Without Selling Out): Earned Income Strategies
for Nonprofits, I7I Strategic Tools for Social Entrepreneurs: Enhancing
the Performance of Your Enterprising Nonprofit, 172 The Social
Enterprise Sourcebook, I73 and finally, the charities' guide to
"Comparative Performance Measurement." 174 For managers of those
charitable organizations that survived the Reagan era, and whose

168. Id.; see also Gottry, supra note 166, at 253-54 (arguing that both President
George H.W. Bush's "Points of Light" strategy and President Bill Clinton's backing
of AmeriCorps endorsed the Reaganesque notion that social services could be
provided by well-meaning volunteers).
169. Hall, supra note 118, at 89 (arguing the Reagan administration almost
destroyed the nonprofit sector under the pretext of getting the federal government
out of nonprofits' way).
170. Rolfe Larson, Venture Forth!:
The Essential Guide to Starting a
Moneymaking Business in Your Nonprofit Organization (2002).
171. Andy Robinson, Selling Social Change (Without Selling Out): Earned
Income Strategies for Nonprofits (2002).
172. Greg Dees et al., Strategic Tools for Social Entrepreneurs: Enhancing the
Performance of Your Enterprising Nonprofit (2002).
173. Jerr Boschee, The Social Enterprise Sourcebook (2001).
174. Scott P. Bryant et al., Comparative Performance Measurement (2001 ).
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organizations have been forced to retool themselves to compete in the
free market, these guidebooks are essential reading.
The
headlong
rush
by
American
charities
toward
"commercialization" and "marketization" can perhaps be understood
best if we divide the movement into two categories that in reality are
different aspects of the same phenomenon: social entrepreneurship
and venture philanthropy.
1. Social Entrepreneurship

Faced with increasing competition for donations and public funds,
and under pressure from philanthropic foundations, 175 a growing
number of nonprofit charities are adopting the culture and practices
of commercial ventures. 176 Twenty years ago the word "entrepreneur"
did not exist in the world of charities. Now nonprofits "identify their
market niches, to maximize their comparative advantages, to think of
their clients as customers, to devise marketing plans, and to engage in
strategic planning." 177 They worry to an ever-greater extent about
measurable outcomes and impact, assessing their performance, and
demonstrating their cost-effectiveness. 178
A few concrete examples from the charitable sector will illustrate
this sea change. In Durham, North Carolina, a charitable, long-term
residential drug rehabilitation center is designed such that the
recovering addicts work in profit-making businesses ranging from
bricklaying to house painting. These businesses serve the dual
purpose of training the addicts for life after drug dependency and
generating millions of untaxed dollars per year that go to support the
organization's operating budget. Although members of Durham's
business community occasionally complain about having to compete
with a charity, 179 the organization most often is lauded in the local
press for showing plucky, entrepreneurial spirit and for running a

175. See infra Part 11.D.2.
176. Sharon Oster, Nonprofit Ventures: The Good Ones Are Profitable, Chron.
Philanthropy, Apr. 15, 2002, at 18; see also Salamon, The Resilient Sector, supra note
158, at 30-38 (arguing charitable nonprofits have undergone a "quiet revolution" and
adopted an "enterprise culture"); Young & Salamon, supra note 3, at 424 (arguing
commercial activity in the nonprofit sector is not new but it appears to have taken a
quantum leap over the past decade or more); Jessica Pena & Alexander L.T. Reid,
Note, A Call for Reform of the Operational Test for Unrelated Commercial Activity in
Charities, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1855, 1856-58 (2001).
177. Young & Salamon,supra note 3, at 437.
178. Id.; see also Gary Walker & Jean Grossman, Philanthropy and Outcomes:
Dilemmas in the Quest for Accountability, in Philanthropy and the Nonprofit Sector in
a Changing America, supra note 16, at 450 (claiming the "outcomes movement"
represents a more stylish, current jargon for a concept that has existed for a long
time).
179. See Ronnie Glassberg, Nonprofit Competing in Private Sector Criticized,
Durham Herald Sun, Jan. 7, 2001, at Bl.
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large charity that costs taxpayers very little. 180 In New York, the
Metropolitan Museum of Art generates tens of millions of dollars
through its gift shops, restaurants, parking garages, and other
commercial ventures. 181 Most of that money is exempt from taxation,
and the proceeds go to support the museum's charitable mission. 182 In
Chicago, the Field Museum holds after-hours cocktail socials to
generate revenue to support its charitable mission, and in Nashville,
Baptist Hospital built and maintains a fifteen million dollar training
facility to rent to the Tennessee Titans football team, thus benefiting
from both rental profits and football-related marketing
opportunities. 183 Lest there should be any doubt that the era of profitmaking, entrepreneurial charity has arrived, the Yale School of
Management recently teamed with the Goldman Sachs Foundation
and the Pew Charitable Trusts to create a Partnership on Nonprofit
Ventures that makes cash awards and provides technical assistance to
encourage charities to engage in profit-making activities to support
their missions. 184
2. Venture Philanthropy
"Venture Philanthropy" is the term used to describe private grantmaking foundations' sharp tum in recent years toward the theory and
practice of the for-profit world. It is the better-funded doppelganger
of "social entrepreneurship."
The popular press celebrates this trend, sometimes under the term
"new philanthropy," as an exciting group of social venture capitalists
"who use Wall Street solutions to tackle urban poverty." 185 They
combine the "desire to help the needy with a geek's approach to
problem solving," they "invest" their money rather than donate it, and
they are guided by the fundamental question of "[w]here is the highest
return on investment?" 186 The press condemns "old philanthropy" as
money "doled out by bureaucrats from mahogany-paneled rooms,"
180. Paul Bonner, TROSA Breathing New Life Into Old Plant: Milk Factory to
House Budding Enterprises for Recovering Addicts, Durham Herald Sun, Nov. 14,
1996, at Cl; Rick Martinez, Moving Into the Mainstream, News & Observer (Raleigh),
Dec. 24, 2003, at All; Karine Michael, Nonprofits in Business to Pay Own Way;
Fewer Grants, Growing Need Force Review of Bottom Line, Durham Herald Sun,
Sept. 9, 1998, at Bl.
181. Stephanie Strom, Nonprofit Groups Reach for Profits on the Side, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 17,2002,atl32.
182. Id.
183. John D. Colombo, Commercial Activity and Charitable Tax Exemption, 44
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 487, 489 (2002).
184. In Brief- Managing, Chron. Philanthropy, May 2, 2002, at 26; see also Yale
Sch. of Mgmt.-The Goldman Sachs Found. P'ship on Nonprofit Ventures,
Homepage, at http://ventures.yale.edu (last visited Mar. 23, 2005).
185. Michele Orecklin, How Better to Give, Chron. Philanthropy, Nov. 5, 2001, at
78.
186. Adam Cohen, When You Have $24 Billion ... , Time, Nov. 5, 2001, at 80.
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and celebrates the new philanthropists as a "new breed of social
entrepreneurs coming out of Harvard Business School or failed dotcoms."187
Modeling themselves on venture capital firms, the venture
philanthropists seek to "catalyze major public change," by creating
"nonprofit capital markets" in which funders manage "portfolios of
social investments" with varying degrees of "social risk and return." 188
They use a combination of "grant and loan instruments" to implement
their investments, try to "maximize the social returns on their
investments," and even use "metrics," "technology-based tools," and
rating services to carry out their social return assessments. 189 Like
venture capitalists, venture philanthropists often demand seats on the
boards of the organizations they back, and from the start they create
an exit strategy in case their performance expectations are not met. 190
Accelerating this trend, a host of intermediary organizations have
sprung up to teach donors how to adopt this model, and, ultimately,
"pick social investment winners." 191
For our purposes, the main effect of all this venture philanthropy is
that the charitable organizations that depend on philanthropic
donations are forced to adopt the methods of business and venture
capital if they want to continue to receive the foundations' support. In
the 197Os and 198Os, it was the government that was pushing charities
toward the market. Today, private foundations are doing the same.
Commentators on American charity range from enthusiastic to
apprehensive 192 about the explosion of venture philanthropy and
187. Adam Piore, Charities That Hate to Just "Give," Newsweek, Feb. 4, 2002, at
37.
188. Id.
189. Young & Salamon, supra note 3, at 438; see also Todd Coher, Global
Marketplace: Rockefeller Foundation Launches Acumen Fund, The Non-Profit
Times, Aug. 15, 2001, at 15; Dana Flavelle, Charities Run Like For-Profit Businesses,
Toronto Star, Apr. 22, 2002, at Cl (discussing a billionaire venture capitalist who
developed a method for measuring "social return on investment" or SROI); Brad
Wolverton, "Business Week": A New Era of Philanthropy, Chron. Philanthropy, Dec.
12,
2002,
at
31.
See
generally
Acumen
Fund,
Homepage,
at
http://www.acumenfund.org (last visited Mar. 23, 2005).
190. Piore, supra note 187, at 37.
191. Scott Harris, Giving When It Hurts, The Industry Standard.Com, July 30, 2001,
at http://www.theindustrystandard.com (helping foundations "convert from the
bureaucratic paradigm" to the methods of "strategic philanthropists"); see Beth
Healy, Strategy for Giving Start-Up a Vehicle for Budding Philanthropists, Boston
Globe, Nov. 23, 2001, at B14.
192. Criticisms are many, but perhaps two varieties are most common. First are the
ethical and legal criticisms. Commentators point to numerous instances where
entrepreneurial charitable organizations either enrich their principle staff people or
divert business toward for-profit affiliates. See, e.g., Burton A. Weisbrod, The
Nonprofit Mission and Its Financing: Growing Links Between Nonprofits and the Rest
of the Economy, in To Profit or Not To Profit: The Commercial Transformation Of
The Nonprofit Sector 1 (Burton A. Weisbrod ed., 1998) (discussing a widely criticized
endorsement deal between the nonprofit American Medical Association and the
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social entrepreneurship in the United States, but practically all agree
that the shift has been developing for a long time, has deep roots in
American culture, and that it is here to stay. 193
E. Summary
Man's tendency to act charitably toward his fellow man is a "hard
wired" aspect of humanity, and charity as a fundamental social and
cultural norm can be traced to antiquity. The Anglo-American legal
and cultural tradition of charity sprang out of Judeo-Christian notions
of love and selflessness. The pre-Reformation version of charity
required God's servants to aid the suffering without inquiry into
whether they were deserving of kindness. 194
As early as the thirteenth century, there were rumblings that charity
would be caught up in the drastic economic and social changes
unfolding in England. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries there
were halting, awkward legislative efforts to contain the wandering and

Sunbeam Corporation); Gary E. Knell, Sesame Workshop Misrepresented, Chron.
Philanthropy, Nov. 15, 2001, at 39 (discussing and defending against accusation that
nonprofits are making untoward, tax-exempt profits); Editorial, Marie C. Malaro,
Former Director ... , Wash. Post, Feb. 10, 2002, at B2 (reporting controversy when a
corporate donor to the Smithsonian Institute gave forceful input on the content of
funded exhibits); Jeffrey R. Young, College Board Shuts Down For-Profit Entity,
Chron. Higher Educ., Jan. 24, 2003, at A34 (claiming it is ethically suspect for a
nonprofit testing organization to sell on-line services related to its tests). Second,
critics point to erosion of society's trust in charities as they become more
commercially market-oriented. See Clotfelter & Ehrlich, The World We Must Build,
in Philanthropy and the Nonprofit Sector in a Changing America, supra note 16, at
500. The argument is that the charitable nonprofit sector has provided American
society with a philosophical structure and a language with which to express moral
values and a noncompetitive arena in which to build a stronger civil society. Robert L.
Payton, A Tradition in Jeopardy, in Philanthropy and the Nonprofit Sector in a
Changing America, supra note 16, at 485. Now, however, the nonprofit sector's
claims to exist for the public good-the very grounds on which society justifies
exempting the sector from taxation-are no longer taken on faith. The growing
confluence of the market and charity is feeding the idea that the charitable sector is
not the only, nor necessarily the best, guardian of public worth. Evelyn Brody,
Accountability and Public Trust, in The State of Nonprofit America, supra note 2, at
472. There is one other broad category of criticism of the blending of sectors: a
practical critique. It holds that the need to generate income and closely justify all
expenditures leaves charities little incentive to focus services on the poor because
serving them costs the most. The pressure to be entrepreneurial pushes managers of
charitable organizations away from assuming responsibility for costly services. In
such a system, who is going to take care of the crack addicts and ex-offenders? See
William Diaz, For Whom and for What? The Contributions of the Nonprofit Sector, in
The State of Nonprofit America, supra note 2, at 519; see also Young & Salamon,
Commercialization, Social Ventures, and For-Profit Competition, in The State of
Nonprofit America, supra note 3, at 442.
193. See Glen Gose, A Revolution Was Ventured but What Did it Gain?, Chron.
Philanthropy, Aug. 21, 2003, at 6 (reporting that venture philanthropy's influence has
continued despite the economic downturn).
194. See Gladstone, supra note 7, at 30.
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begging that was arising as a result of enclosures and early
mercantilism. 195
The reign of Henry VIII marked a stark change in the law and
culture of Anglo-American charity. Henry's Reformation, combined
with the enclosure movement and the rise of mercantile capitalism,
gave rise to a new conception of charity that was more secular,
focused on addressing poverty and pauperism ("social engineering")
rather than divine grace for the donor, and included at its core the
notion that enterprise and work were the most effective tools for
addressing poverty.
Through numerous legislative acts in the sixteenth century,
culminating in the Poor Laws and the Statute of Charitable Uses of
1601, the state acknowledged that it, along with private donors, had a
role to play in addressing poverty. Its preferred method for carrying
out that role was to force work upon those in need, and to severely
punish the sturdy poor who shirked.
Early American charity followed a similar path, and was premised
on the belief of man's individual responsibility before God, on the
discouragement of "promiscuous alms," and on the identification of
work with moral rectitude and divine approval. 196 After the Civil War,
with the rise of friendly visiting and scientific philanthropy, the
attitude of poverty as moral vice persisted, while at the same time the
language and methods of the free market began to infiltrate American
charity. After the turn of the century, American culture and
American law began to accept the view that commercial activity could
and indeed should be closely associated with charity.
The Reagan revolution pushed charities toward the market by
cutting back on funds for their operations and by implementing
policies that compelled them to compete-with one another and with
for-profit companies-for scarce dollars. At the same time, the
Reagan administration and subsequent administrations celebrated a
rhetoric of compassionate service to the needy and volunteerism.
During the 1990s, the trend toward commercialization of charity
strengthened as technology-boom millionaires entered the charitable
realm and insisted on the adoption of business methods, and as
private foundations increasingly adopted the rhetoric and practices of
venture philanthropy. By the end of the 1990s, it was becoming
difficult to distinguish between business and charity.
It is important for our purposes to emphasize that while the cultural
and legal conception of charity has shifted away from alms to the poor
and toward social engineering since the reign of Henry VIII, the older
brand of vulgar charity has persisted. 197
195. See Leonard, supra note 35, at 9; supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
196. See supra Part I.B.5.
197. See supra Part I.B.l.; see also Gray, supra note 28, at vii.
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II. CHARITY LAW IN THE UNITED STA TES: THE DEEP ROOTS OF
CONFUSION

We have completed a sweep through the history of AngloAmerican charity. We have seen how our culture has maintained
through the centuries a split definition of charity, meaning both aid to
the poor based on love and compassion and social engineering, often
premised on the assumption that providing work was the primary, if
not the only, valid response to poverty. We will now narrow our focus
to the American law of charity and discover that our society's
unresolved definition of charity has led to a legal regime that most
commentators consider incoherent 198 and confusing. 199
A. Confusion in Early Case Law Definitions of Charity

Today, most charity law in the United States emanates from the
federal government, particularly in the Internal Revenue Code and
the accompanying regulations. However, federal tax laws did not
begin to affect American charity in any significant way until after the
institution of federal income tax in 1913.200 The American legal
system's confusion about charity was evident significantly earlier.
In the late 1800s and early 1900s, state courts across the country
expressed disagreement over the proper legal definition of charity. 201
Some, hewing to the vulgar conception, held that charity was
"whatever is given for the love of God, or for the love of your
neighbor, in the Catholic and universal sense-given from these
motives, and to those ends, free from the stain or taint of every
consideration that is personal, private, or selfish." 202 Others insisted
that a donor's motivation for giving was irrelevant, and that the
proper legal definition of charity, in the tradition of the Statute of
Charitable Uses and the English common law, depended on whether
the gift in question was for the benefit of the general public and eased
burdens on government. 203
Echoing the problems that contemporary charities face, state courts
in that day disagreed over what should happen when purported
charities produced earned income. Numerous cases assessed the
198. Fishman, supra note 4, at 618; Gary N. Scrivner, 100 Years of Tax Policy
Changes Affecting Charitable Organizations, in The Nonprofit Organization:
Essential Readings, supra note 13, at 126.
199. See Hopkins, supra note 2, at 90 (arguing that Congress itself was confused
over what it meant by "charitable" when it passed charitable tax legislation).
200. See infra Part 11.B for a discussion of early federal tax laws.
201. Most of these cases arose in the trust law context or in cases in which
organizations were seeking property tax abatements based on their purportedly
charitable status.
202. See supra note 2; see also Hamburger v. Cornell Univ., 199 N.Y.S. 369, 372
(App. Div. 1923).
203. See, e.g., Fire Ins. Patrol v. Boyd, 15 A. 553, 555-56 (Pa. 1888).
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charitable status of poorhouses, workhouses, and convalescent homes
that required residents to engage in profit-generating labor to defray
the organizations' operating expenses. Some state courts had no
trouble finding such organizations charitable204 even where the
commercial activities were substantial and funds went to the pay the
salaries of staff members. 205
Other courts examining similar
organizations assigned charitable status only if they found that the
organizations did not use the commercially generated fees to pay
salaries for the organization's employees,206 or that the fee-generating
activity was merely "incidental to the organization's charitable
mission. " 207
Similarly, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
courts around the country grappled with whether organizations like
schools and hospitals that accepted or demanded fees from the
beneficiaries of their services could be considered charitable. Some
courts found that schools could charge tuition and remain charitable
so long as the fees did not amount to any more than "self-support" for
the institution. 208 Others required more stringent proof of charitable
purpose from fee-generating organizations, for example, that the
organizations consistently lost money in spite of collecting fees. 209 Still
others rejected charitable status for fee-generating institutions, often
relying on vague rationales such as "the fees charged [were] very
considerable,"210 or conclusory statements that the organization in
question had "a commercial aspect." 211
In short, cases from the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries that wrestled with the legal definition of charity reveal
ambiguity and uncertainty. Results seem to be determined by the
predilections of the examining judges and whether or not they
believed that the organizations in question looked and felt charitable
given their particular conceptions of the meaning and role of charity.
204. See, e.g., House of Refuge v. Smith, 21 A. 353,353 (Pa. 1891).
205. See Paterson Rescue Mission v. High, 44 A. 974,976 (N.J. 1899).
206. See, e.g., House of the Good Shepherd of Omaha v. Bd. of Equalization (In re
House of the Good Shepherd of Omaha), 203 N.W. 632,634 (Neb. 1925).
207. Contributors to Pa. Hosp. v. Delaware County, 32 A. 456, 457 (Pa. 1895); see
also Franklin Square House v. City of Boston, 74 N.E. 675 (Mass. 1905).
208. State ex rel. Cunningham v. Bd. of Assessors of Parish of Orleans, 26 So. 872,
875 (La. 1898); Trs. of Acad. of Protestant Episcopal Church v. Taylor, 25 A. 55, 57
(Pa. 1892); see also Santa Rosa Infirmary v. San Antonio, 259 S.W. 926, 936 (Tex.
1924).
209. Trs. of Ky. Female Orphan Sch. v. City of Louisville, 36 S.W. 921, 924 (Ky.
1896) (relying on the fact that charges were "incidental"); Bd. of Comm'rs of Tulsa
County v. Sisters of the Sorrowful Mother, 283 P. 984, 985 (Okla. 1930).
210. Bancroft Sch. v. State Bd. of Taxes and Assessment, 60 A. 390, 391 (N.J.
1932); see also Boston Symphony Orchestra v. Bd. of Assessors, 1 N.E.2d 6, 10 (Mass.
1936) (rejecting charitable status for symphony partly on grounds that it charged too
much for tickets); Dwight Sch. of Englewood v. State Bd. of Tax Appeais, 177 A. 875,
877 (N.J. 1935) (finding teachers' salaries too high and school profits too great).
211. Bancroft, 160 A. at 391.

2470

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73

Some cases showed a preference for charity as compassion, holding to
the view that an act must spring from Christian love and be directed at
the relief of suffering if it were to enjoy the legal advantages of
charitable status. Others implicitly or explicitly approved of charity as
social engineering in which charitable recipients could be compelled
to work for their keep and where commerce was a legitimate tool for
accomplishing socially desirable ends.

B. Confusion in the Early Federal Tax Law Definition of Charity
In the late 1800s, as state courts around the country were wrestling
awkwardly and inconsistently with the legal conception of charity, the
center of gravity of charity law began to shift toward the federal
government. The transition began with the federal government's
efforts to impose the country's first income taxes and, along with the
income tax laws, the country's first charitable tax exemptions. If the
transition from state to federal law presented an opportunity to clarify
our country's uncertain legal understanding of charity, that
opportunity was missed.
The Tariff Act of 1894, the first major piece of federal legislation
that attempted to specify what types of organizations would be subject
to federal taxation, exempted nonprofit charitable, religious, and
educational organizations and provided for a corporate income tax
deduction for donations to charitable entities. 212 Although the 1894
Act was overturned on constitutional grounds, similar legislation was
passed in 1913 after the implementation of the 16th Amendment. 213
Setting a pattern of uncertainty, the legislative committee reports that
accompanied the 1913 Act revealed little about Congress's
motivations for exempting charitable organizations from taxation, or
about what it considered to be charitable. 214
Bruce Hopkins offers two related arguments to support an assertion
that Congress, from the time it first passed the charitable tax
exemption until quite recently, intended to use the word "charity" in
its vulgar sense. His first argument is one of common-sense statutory
construction.
The early tax codes' description of tax-exempt
organizations always used the terms "charitable, religious, or
educational." If Congress had intended the word "charitable" to be
understood in its broad, English common law, social engineering
sense, it would not have made sense to enumerate the other types of
organizations (religious or educational), because the common law
definition was more than broad enough to subsume them. It thus

212. Tariff Act of 1894, ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509, 556; see Scrivner, supra note 198, at
126.
213. Scrivner, supra note 198, at 127.
214. Id.
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stands to reason that Congress was using the term charity in its vulgar,
narrower sense of aiding the poor. 215
Hopkins's statutory construction argument is buttressed by
subsequent legislative history. Through the early and mid-twentieth
century, each new revision of the Revenue Act contained a provision
that included the charitable tax exemption-the provisions that later
became known by the Code section that contained them, 501(c)(3).
With each revision, the regulations that accompanied the acts
consistently defined charity as "relief of the poor." 216 For example,
during the fifteen years that the Revenue Act of 1939 was in effect,
the IRS issued three separate sets of regulations, and each of them
defined the term charitable in its vulgar sense. 217 When Congress
passed the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, (which was when the
charitable tax exemption provisions first were gathered in section
501), an accompanying report of the House Committee on Ways and
Means commented that "[n]o change in substance has been made." 218
Thus, at the adoption of section 501 of the Code in 1954, the popular
a_nd ordinary, or vulgar, meaning of the term charitable governed the
definition of that word for federal tax purposes. 219
However, by the time the IRS regulations to the 1954 Act appeared
in 1959, the IRS, without the approval of Congress, had vastly
expanded the federal tax definition of charitable. Those regulations
defined it
in its generally accepted legal sense, [m]eaning [r]elief of poor and
distressed or of the underprivileged; advancement of religion;
advancement of education or science; erection or maintenance of
public buildings, monuments, or works; lessening of the burdens of
Government; and promotion of social welfare by organizations
designed to accomplish any of the above purposes, or (i) to lessen
neighborhood tensions; (ii) to eliminate prejudice and
discrimination; (iii) to defend human and civil rights secured by law;
or (iv) to combat community deterioration and juvenile
delinquency. 220

215. Hopkins, supra note 2, at 90. The obvious practical result of this narrower
definition would be that socially beneficial organizations would not qualify for tax
exemption unless they benefit the poor and needy, are religious, or educational.
Indeed, early administrative decisions by the IRS indicate that this was their view.
See, e.g., I.T. 1800, 2-2 C.B. 152, 153 (1923).
216. See, e.g., Treas Reg. § 19.101(6)-1 (1938); Treas. Reg. 94, art. 101(6)-1 (1936);
Treas. Reg. 69, art. 517 (1926); Treas. Reg. 65, art. 517 (1924); see also, Hopkins, supra
note 2, at 91.
217. Hopkins, supra note 2, at 91.
218. Internal Revenue Code, ch. 736, 68 Stat. 163, 163 (current version at 26 U.S.C.
§ 501 (2000)); Hopkins, supra note 2, at 91 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 83-1337, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess., at 165 (1954), 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4017).
219. Hopkins, supra note 2, at 91.
220. Treas Reg.§ 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(2) (as amended in 1990).
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Suddenly, with the issuance of this language, it appeared that aiding
the poor was only one meaning of charitable. For federal tax
purposes, the English common law notions of charity-including ideas
about social engineering through finding work for the needycounted. 221
The 1959 IRS regulations adopted a definition of charity that
apparently was at odds with what Congress intended, but because
Congress never took action to reign in the expanded legal definition,
it became accepted doctrine with the passage of time and is the legal
definition of charity that we live with today. 222 As to why Congress
remained silent, we simply do not know.
What we do know is that Congress's inaction left us with a legal
definition broad enough (one might say vague enough) 223 to
encompass all of the diverse meanings of charity that had come down
through the Anglo-American cultural and legal tradition. It is this
vague definition that has led in our day to confused and contradictory
court cases and legal doctrines. 224 In recent times, as the trends
toward social entrepreneurship and venture philanthropy have
accelerated,225 and as the bounds between for-profit and nonprofit
enterprises have blurred, our vague, ill-discussed, ill-defined legal
definition of charity has been too amorphous to lend structure to the
difficult task of sorting out what is and is not charitable in the eyes of
the law. The result has been the piecemeal, ad hoc development of
the unworkable, often inconsistent legal doctrines discussed below.
C. Confusion in Contemporary Legal Doctrines Governing American

Charity
Lacking a specific, workable definition of charity, federal tax law
has developed a series of tests and doctrines to help it determine
which activities and organizations should qualify for charitable tax
exemption and which should not. These tests include the operational
test, the commerciality doctrine, UBIT, and the commensurate-inscope doctrine.
When today's entrepreneurial charities find
themselves caught in the double bind described in the introduction to
this Article, their legal problems often stem from some combination
of these. Although it is possible to devise a conceptual framework
that separates and to a large extent harmonizes the doctrines, in
practice the IRS and examining courts apply them interchangeably
221. Id.
222. Id.; Hopkins, supra note 2, at 92.
223. See Hopkins, supra note 2, at 92 (arguing that today's legal definition of
charity is unmanageably broad); see also Tommy F. Thompson, The
Unadministrability of the Federal Charitable Tax Exemption: Causes, Effects and
Remedies, 5 Va. Tax Rev. 1, 13-14 (1985).
224. See supra Parts 11.A-B.
225. See supra Part I.D.

2005]

REDISCOVERING VULGAR CHARITY

2473

and inconsistently, such that contemporary entrepreneurial charitieseven those with sophisticated legal counsel-cannot confidently
navigate them. The discussion below briefly summarizes the doctrines
and explains why together they constitute a murky legal swamp.
1. The Operational Test

The first significant legal step for a charitable organization wishing
to obtain exemption from federal income taxation is to pass the IRS's
operational test. 226 It can be an exacting test, and it is the first place
that many new organizations, particularly those with an
entrepreneurial bent, become mired in the confusing American law of
charity.
The operational test requires that an "organization's resources must
be devoted to purposes that qualify as exclusively charitable within
the meaning of section 501(c)(3) of the [IRS] Code and the applicable
regulations." 227 The word "exclusively" in the statute is interpreted by
IRS regulations to mean "primarily" or "substantially," 228 so that an
aspiring charity will fail the operational test if more than an
insubstantial part of its activities are not in furtherance of its
charitable purpose. 229 There are certain common non-charitable
activities that cause aspiring or existing charities to fail the operational
test; for example, because they pay profits to insiders, devote their
services to a too-narrow class of beneficiaries, or engage in
inappropriate amounts of lobbying or in political campaigning. 230
More relevant for our purposes, the operational test also ensnares
organizations that devote too much of their efforts to commercial
rather than charitable activity. Given the burgeoning growth of
commercial enterprise among charitable organizations,231 it should not
be surprising that the operational test has become a problem for many
organizations. 232
For all the vagaries of the operational test, discussed below, it
clearly does permit charities to engage in some degree of commercial
activity. The vexing question is, "How much?" Section 501(c)(3) of
the Code neither states nor implies anything about the permissible
226. See Treas. Reg. § l.501(c)(3)-l(a)-(b). Aspiring charities must also pass the
IRS's "organizational test," which is, in essence, a "magic words" test. The applying
organization merely must show that certain clauses-promising to eschew lobbying
and political activity and all private inurement, for example-have been included in
the organization's founding documents. Id.
227. Hopkins, supra note 2, at 66 (citing Rev. Rul. 72-369, 1972-2 C.B. 245).
228. Treas. Reg.§ l.501(c)(3)-l(c)(l); see Colombo, supra note 183, at 495-96.
229. Treas. Reg.§ l.501(c)(3)-l(c)(l); Hopkins, supra note 2, at 66.
230. See Treas. Reg.§ l.501(c)(3)-l(c)(2)-(3).
231. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
232. Pena & Reid, supra note 176, at 1861 (arguing the operational test is being
used by the IRS "to challenge troublesome amounts of commercial activity in
charities").
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bounds of charities' commercial activities. The related Treasury
Regulations, however, reveal the law's supposed tolerance for profit
making.
Treasury
Regulation
section
l.501(c)(3)-l(e),
concerns
"[o]rganizations carrying on trade or business," which for our
purposes can be taken as synonymous with commercial activity. It
begins with unambiguous language stating that:
An organization may meet the requirements of section 501(c)(3)
although it operates a trade or business as a substantial part of its
activities, if the operation of such trade or business is in furtherance
of the exempt organization's exempt purpose or purposes and if the
organization is not organized or operated for the primary purpose of
carrying on an unrelated trade or business .... 233

Stated otherwise, a charity may operate a trade or business that is in
furtherance of its charitable purpose to whatever extent it pleases
without violating the operational test. If, however, the charity
engages in trade or business that is not in furtherance of its exempt
purpose and if that trade or business becomes the primary purpose of
the organization, it will lose its charitable, tax-exempt status. 234
It is important to emphasize that by the terms of the operational
test regulations, the analysis of a charity's commercial activity should
focus on the purpose of that activity, not its nature. 235 Thus, it should
not matter that a charity serving the blind is fabricating and selling
light bulbs to the public at a profit ( a description of the commercial
nature of the activity) if that activity is intended to provide training
and employment to blind people (a description of the activity's
purpose ). 236
In sum, if one believes the wording of the regulations, the
application of the operational test to charities engaged in commercial
activities should be straightforward: First, identify which commercial
activities are in furtherance of the organization's charitable purposes;
second, make sure that those commercial activities not in furtherance
of the charitable purposes are not the organization's primary
purpose. 237
233. Treas. Reg.§ l.501(c)(3)-l(e).
234. Id.; see Colombo, supra note 183, at 497; Pena & Reid, supra note 176, at 1864.
The confusion of navigating the charity doctrines is compounded by the fact that
these doctrines use inconsistent language. The operational test asks if a given activity
is "in furtherance of" the organization's charitable purpose. Treas. Reg.§ l.501(c)(3)l(e). On the other hand, determining whether UBIT applies to commercial charities
turns on whether the activity is "related to" the organization's charitable purpose.
Conventional thinking is that the differently named concepts mean essentially the
same thing. See Hopkins, supra note 2, at 646.
235. Treas. Reg.§ l.501(c)(3)-l(e)(l).
236. Id; see Bradley Meyers, Revisiting the Commerciality Doctrine, 10 J.
Affordable Housing & Community Dev. L.134, 136 (2001).
237. Treas. Reg. § l.501(c)(3)-l(e )(1); see Pena & Reid, supra note 176, at 1865.

2005]

REDISCOVERING VULGAR CHARITY

2475

But what appears simple in the regulation has become muddled in
the execution. For unknown reasons (though I will speculate in Part
II.C.5, below) the IRS eschews the obvious two-part inquiry, and
instead employs a "subjective 'facts-and-circumstances' standard" to
determine whether a charity flunks the operational test due to
commercial activity. 238 Under this broad facts-and-circumstances
inquiry, the analysis deteriorates into an unprincipled, unpredictable
test that amounts to an examination of whether the organization
"smell[s] like" a charity to whomever is inquiring. 239
The IRS and courts applying the operational test to commercial
activity by charities also routinely ignore the distinction between
examining the nature of the activity and the purpose of the activity.
One of the seminal court decisions in this area, B.S. W. Group, Inc. v.
Commissioner, explained the law correctly, saying that it is the
"purpose towards which an organization's activities are directed, and
not the nature of the activities themselves, [that are] ultimately
dispositive of the organization's right to be classified as a section
501(c)(3) organization." 240 However, many other courts241 and the
IRS itself242 routinely confuse the analysis and focus on the nature of
the activities (whether they look and feel inappropriately
commercial), ignoring the question of whether the activities are
related to the organizations' charitable purposes. More often than
not, examining authorities launch into a facts-and-circumstances test
whenever an organization engages in commercial activity of any
kind. 243 When this happens, the determination of charitable status
under the operational test becomes as untethered and ad hoc as the
muddled state court decisions that determined the legal bounds of
charity at the end of the nineteenth century. 244
238. Pena & Reid, supra note 176, at 1865.
239. Id.
240. B.S.W. Group, Inc. v. Comm'r, 70 T.C. 352, 356-57 (1978).
241. See, e.g., Nonprofits' Ins. Alliance of Cal. v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 277, 293
(1994) (upholding denial of tax exemption to organization that provided insurance to
nonprofits); Bethel Conservative Mennonite Church v. Comm'r, 80 T.C. 352, 361
(1983) (upholding denial of exemption where church offered medical plan to
congregation members only) rev'd, 746 F.2d 388, 391-92 (7th Cir. 1984) (ruling the
Tax Court should have inquired whether medical plan furthered the church's exempt
purposes); Copyright Clearance Ctr. v. Comm'r, 79 T.C. 793, 803 (1982) (finding
nonexempt purpose but failing to analyze organization's charitable purposes); see also
Pena & Reid, supra note 176, at 1870.
242. See Pena & Reid, supra note 176, at 1883. These student commentators argue
that while the IRS formally asserts that it adheres to the judicially created facts-andcircumstances test to determine whether or not a charity is engaging in substantial
amounts of unrelated commerce in violation of the operational test, its administrative
rulings have rarely involved this analysis. In practice, the IRS generally makes
determinations in a conclusory manner, offering minimal rationale and often simply
bypassing the inquiry all together. Id. at 1884.
243. See id. at 1871.
244. See supra Part II.A.
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Why is this area of law beset by such doctrinal confusion? One
answer is that judges and administrative authorities have difficulty
pinpointing what qualifies as "in furtherance of" a legitimate
charitable purpose because there is no precise, widely accepted view
of what the law means by charity. Had Congress stuck to the original
definition contained in the earliest federal charitable exemption
provisions, relief of the poor, it would have been comparatively simple
for judges to determine which commercial activities did and did not
qualify as "in furtherance of." Instead, we have inherited the
definition of charity laid out in Treasury Regulation section
l.501(c)(3)-l(d)(2), which includes within its ambit not only religion
and education but such hazy concepts as the "lessening of the burdens
of Government," and the "promotion of social welfare." This makes
it extremely difficult for judges and regulators and for charities
themselves to make meaningful, legally recognizable distinctions
between commercial activity that is and is not in furtherance of a
charitable purpose. 245
There is another more speculative, but perhaps more compelling,
explanation of why judges and administrators wield the wet noodle of
the facts-and-circumstances test when called upon to distinguish
between charitable and non-charitable organizations under the
operational test. That explanation, which draws upon the historical
tradition of Anglo-American charity, will be laid out in more detail in
Part 11.C.5 below.
2. The Commerciality Doctrine
The commerciality doctrine is so vague and malleable that it strains
the bounds of legal rhetoric to call it a doctrine. 246 However, this
particular doctrine ( or non-doctrine) wreaks havoc in the world of
entrepreneurial charities, and since it is difficult to critique a doctrine
that completely lacks substance, we must attempt to sketch its
contours and explain its application.
By way of definition, Hopkins offers the following gossamer
explanation of commerciality:
A tax-exempt organization is engaged in a nonexempt activity when
that activity is engaged in a manner that is considered commercial.
An act is a commercial one if it has a direct counterpart in, or is
245. See Thompson, supra note 223, at 12-13.
246. This footnote is intended for readers familiar with the Harry Potter series of
novels. I explain the commerciality doctrine to my law students by likening it to the
bludger in a game of quiddich. The bludger is a small, hard ball that flies through the
air knocking players off their broomsticks when they are concentrating on other
aspects of the game. Like the commerciality doctrine, the bludger produces anxiety in
players because it is absolutely unpredictable: No one knows when it will strike and
what kind of damage it will cause. See J.K. Rowling, Harry Potter and the Sorcerer's
Stone (1999).
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conducted in the same manner as is the case in the realm of forprofit organizations. 247

If that description of the doctrine's ambit sounds familiar, it is
because we just completed a discussion of the operational test, which,
in the context of charitable organizations that engage in commercial
activities, can cover much the same ground. The two doctrines can be
conceptually harmonized if one considers the commerciality doctrine
as a subset of the operational test. That is, when a court or the IRS
applies the operational test to determine whether a charity engages in
more than an "insubstantial amount" of non-charitable activity, and if
the non-charitable activity in question is commercial activity unrelated
to the organization's mission (as opposed to, say, lobbying), then the
examining authority will apply the commerciality doctrine.
Life for entrepreneurial charities would be easier if courts and the
IRS consistently applied the operational test and the commerciality
doctrine in this way, but alas they do not. In practice, courts and the
IRS sometimes assess commercial activity using the rubric of the
operational test without ever mentioning the commerciality doctrine;
others do the opposite, and a few actually mention both and attempt
to describe the connection between the two. 248
Forced to grapple with such a slippery doctrine, the first instinct of a
lawyer representing an entrepreneurial charity would be to examine
the words of the statute from whence it came. In this case, however,
the examination would prove fruitless, as the doctrine grew out of
"loose language in court opinions, which in tum seem to have
reflected judges' personal views as to what the law ought to be (rather
than what it is)." 249
The first whispers of commerciality appeared in the 1924 case
Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores de la Provincia def
Santisimo Rosario de Filipinas, 250 in which the Supreme Court
grappled with whether a religious order could be considered
charitable and thus exempt from federal income taxation where the
order produced revenue through real estate and stock investments as
well as through the limited sale of commercial products such as
chocolate and wine. 251 The IRS, arguing before the development of
today's operational test, contended that the religious order was
maintained for "business and commercial purposes," and therefore
should have its charitable tax exemption revoked. 252 The Court
rejected this argument, relying vaguely on the rationale that the
organization was not engaged in "competition" with for-profit firms,
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

Hopkins, supra note 2, at 629-30.
See Colombo, supra note 183, at 497.
Hopkins, supra note 2, at 633; see also Meyers, supra note 236, at 134.
263 U.S. 578 (1924).
Id. at 580-81.
Id. at 581.
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and that the profits that were generated by the various activities were
a "negligible factor" in its overall funding. 253 From these seemingly
innocuous statements, the commerciality doctrine was born. 254
The commerciality emanations from the U.S. Supreme Court
opinion in Trinidad gave rise to a brief golden era in the development
of commercial enterprises by charities. The presiding legal doctrine
became known as the destination-of-income test, which held, in
essence, that so long as an organization's commercial profits were
destined to fund its charitable goals, its status as a tax-exempt charity
was safe. 255 Commercial "feeder organizations" sprang up that
generated commercial profits and then fed these profits directly to
their parent charities.
Until they were reigned in, charitable
organizations felt free to run businesses that were completely
unrelated to their charitable missions, and whose profits supported
their charitable work. The most notorious of these was the Mueller
Macaroni Company, which held a significant share of the United
States macaroni market, but which generated all of its profits tax-free
because it was owned by and fed its earnings to New York University
School of Law. 256
A little more than twenty years after Trinidad, the Court applied
the commerciality doctrine in a way that called into question the
viability of the destination-of-income test. In Better Business Bureau
v. United States, 257 the Court was asked to determine whether the
Better Business Bureau qualified for exemption as an educational
organization. The Court stated that the "exclusivity" requirement of
section 501(c)(3) of the Code "plainly means that the presence of a
single noneducational purpose, if substantial in nature, will destroy
the exemption regardless of the number or importance of truly
educational purposes." 258 It concluded that although most of the
Better Business Bureau's activities were indeed educationalteaching merchants about ethical business practices, for example-its
goal of promoting a profitable local business community was
noneducational, that the organization therefore could be said to have
a "commercial hue," and that its "activities [were] largely animated by
this commercial purpose. " 259
In the years before and after the Better Business Bureau decision,
there was confusion over how much, if any, commercial activity
charities could permissibly engage in. Some rulings applied the
253. Id. at 582.
254. See Hopkins, supra note 2, at 634; Colombo, supra note 183, at 497-98.
255. See Meyers, supra note 236, at 136.
256. See C.F. Mueller Co. v. Comm'r, 479 F.2d 678 (3d Cir. 1973) (upholding denial
of tax exemption for macaroni profits).
257. 326 U.S. 279 (1945).
258. Id. at 283.
259. Id. at 283-84; see also Hopkins, supra note 2, at 635; Colombo, supra note 183,
at 499.
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destination-of-income test260 while others grappled awkwardly with
Better Business Bureau's "commercial hue" concept. 261 Attempts to
clarify the field came in two forms. First, in 1950 Congress passed
UBIT, which eliminated the destination-of-income test and began
taxing commercial activity that was unrelated to exempt
organizations' charitable purposes. Second, federal courts handed
down a series of decisions that put teeth, if not predictability, into the
commerciality doctrine. We will examine the further development of
the commerciality doctrine directly below, and then tum in Part 11.C.3
to a description of UBIT and its effects.
In the 1960s, the IRS and courts began regularly applying the
commerciality doctrine, striking fear into the hearts of fee-generating
charities. 262 The vagaries of the doctrine were revealed in a line of
cases focusing on nonprofit religious publishing organizations. The
first, Scripture Press Foundation v. United States, 263 involved an
organization that published and sold religious texts with the aim of
improving the quality of Protestant Sunday school instruction.264 The
organization became highly successful and accumulated more than
$1.6 million in profits, an amount the IRS found unacceptable and the
court agreed was "very substantial." 265 The court concluded that the
large profits furnished "some evidence indicative of a commercial
character." 266 The court also found it significant that Scripture
conducted its business in a manner similar to for-profit religious
publishers, and engaged only in an "incidental" amount of activity
that was purely religious. 267 The court never discussed whether the
profit-generating activity at issue was related or unrelated to the
organization's charitable purpose, as the operational test would have
dictated. 268 The court simply found, based on all the circumstances,
that the organization was too commercial, and revoked its federal tax
exemption.
There followed a series of commerciality cases focusing mainly on
nonprofit publishers. 269 By the time that string of cases ran its course,
260. See, e.g., Roche's Beach, Inc. v. Comm'r, 96 F.2d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1938)
(finding a corporate owner of beach property exempt where profits support a
charitable foundation).
261. See infra notes 270, 275-82 and accompanying text.
262. See Colombo, supra note 183, at 501.
263. 285 F.2d 800 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
264. Id. at 803.
265. Id. at 804.
266. Id. at 803.
267. Id. at 805-06 & n. 11.
268. See supra Part 11.C.l.
269. See, e.g., Elisian Guild, Inc. v. United States, 292 F. Supp. 219, 221 (D. Mass.
1968) (a publisher lost exemption where it conducted itself like a for-profit publisher
and "clearly engaged primarily in a business activity") rev'd, 412 F.2d 121 (1st Cir.
1969) (on grounds that the organization was not excessively commercial where it did
not produce operating profits); Fides Publishers Ass'n v. United States, 263 F. Supp.

2480

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73

it seemed clear that courts and the IRS were going to ignore the
question that was demanded by IRS regulations, namely whether a
given organization's profits were in furtherance of its charitable
mission, and instead would decide commerciality cases based on a
loose and variable determination of whether the organization in
question had an impermissible commercial hue. Given the range of
rationales and outcomes, it was impossible to nail down exactly what
added up to a commercial hue, but factors included: (1) whether the
organization at issue was producing substantial overall profits, (2)
whether the organization was setting prices at or below the level of
commercial firms, and (3) whether the organization was acting in
direct competition with for-profit companies. 270
In a more recent, much discussed case, the U.S. Tax Court agreed
with the denial of exemption for a purportedly charitable and
religious entity affiliated with the Seventh-Day Adventist Church that,
as part of its church mission, maintained vegetarian restaurants and
health food stores.271 The court denied exemption on grounds that the
activities were conducted as a business and that the organization was
in competition with other restaurants and health food stores. 272 On
appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the
tax court opinion, finding that the organization violated the
commerciality doctrine by: (1) selling goods and services to the
general public; (2) engaging in direct competition with commercial
stores and restaurants; (3) setting prices based on formulas common in
the retail food business rather than below cost; (4) using promotional
materials to increase sales; (5) maintaining regular business hours of
operation; (6) paying professionals to run the operations rather than
relying on volunteers; and (7) failing to elicit charitable
contributions. 273 As in previous commerciality doctrine cases,274 the
court provided scant guidance as to how to determine whether a
924 (N.D. Ind. 1967) (publication and sale of religious literature not exempt or
charitable where the commercial activity (i.e., the sale of literature) was its sole
activity; no mention of relatedness); Golden Rule Church Ass'n v. Comm'r, 41 T.C.
719 (1964) (religious organization that conducts training projects found tax exempt
based on fact that it does not generate profits; no discussion of relatedness); Am. Inst.
for Econ. Research v. United States, 302 F.2d 934 (Ct. Cl. 1962) (an organization that
sells newsletters and books to subscribers containing investment advice is not
charitable or educational because it competes with for-profit companies and its
purpose is "primarily business"; no discussion of whether the profit-making activity
was related or unrelated to the charitable mission).
270. See supra note 269; see also Colombo, supra note 183, at 502.
271. Living Faith, Inc. v. Comm'r, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 710 {1990), affd, 950 F.2d 365
(7th Cir. 1991).
272. Id. at 713.
273. Living Faith, Inc., 950 F.2d at 374-75.
274. See, e.g., B.S.W. Group, Inc. v. Comm'r, 70 T.C. 352 {1978) {finding,
purportedly under the operational test but actually under the commerciality doctrine,
that an organization providing consulting services to nonprofits engaged in rural
policy and program development had a "commercial hue").
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substantial unrelated purpose existed, which facts should be taken
into account, and what weight the different facts should be accorded.
Once again, the court failed entirely to consider whether the
commercial activities in question were in furtherance of the
organization's charitable purpose and thus permissible under the
operational test.
The commerciality doctrine, with its evaluation of charities'
commercial hue, is still very much alive, but neither the courts nor the
IRS apply it consistently.275 In 1984, for example, the Third Circuit
reversed the revocation of exempt status for a religious publisher on
facts very similar to Scripture Press. 276 The tax court had upheld the
IRS's determination that the organization operated with an
impermissible commercial hue, based largely on its significant
profits. 277 The Third Circuit reversed, stating that "success in terms of
audience reached and influence exerted, in and of itself, should not
jeopardize the tax-exempt status of organizations which remain true
to their stated goals." 278 Apparently, the Third Circuit correctly took
into consideration that the organization's commercial activities were
related to its charitable purpose. 279
In several other cases, the tax court itself has seemingly
contradicted its own jurisprudence by finding commercial charities
exempt from taxation. For example, it was called upon to determine
whether an exempt organization that imported and sold artisans'
crafts could be tax exempt. The IRS contended that the organization
was a commercial import firm. 280 The organization countered that its
charitable purpose was, among other things, to help disadvantaged
artisans in poverty-stricken countries subsist and preserve their
craft. 281 The tax court agreed with the organization, finding that it
engaged in the fee-generating activities not as an end in themselves
but as a means of accomplishing legitimate exempt purposes. 282
From the perspective of a fee-generating, entrepreneurial charity,
this and similar cases283 were laudable but hardly comforting since it is
impossible to see in them grounds for a factual or legal distinction
from opposing cases, other than that our courts and administrative

275. See Colombo, supra note 183, at 503.
276. Presbyterian & Reformed Publ'g Co. v. Comm'r, 743 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1984).
277. Presbyterian & Reformed Publ'g Co. v. Comm'r, 79 T.C. 1070, 1088-89 (1982).
278. Presbyterian & Reformed Publ'g Co., 743 F.2d at 158.
279. See id. at 158-59.
280. Aid to Artisans, Inc. v. Comm'r, 71 T.C. 202,208 (1978).
281. Id. at 207-08.
282. Id. at 214; see Hopkins, supra note 2, at 638.
283. See, e.g., Indus. Aid for the Blind v. Comm'r, 73 T.C. 96 (1979) (finding an
organization exempt in spite of profit generation where the organization's purpose
was to purchase and sell products manufactured by blind individuals).
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agencies like poor artisans and do not like comparatively wealthy
consultants and religious book publishers. 284
This brings us back to the quandary introduced at the start Part
11.C.2: How can modem, entrepreneurial charities comply with a
doctrine that sprang from the ether and seems to change every time it
is applied, a doctrine that crept into American charity law through
judges' inchoate sense that commercial activity is incompatible with
tax-exempt status, even though governing statutes and regulations
appear to provide the opposite? Judges and administrators apply the
doctrine ad hoc, taking into account whatever facts they think are
relevant, and seemingly making judgments based on how appealing
they find the charitable missions of the organizations in question. 285
Charities subject to the doctrine find themselves in the position of
having to guess how much profit they are allowed to generate before
jeopardizing their tax-exempt status. 286 As discussed in Part 11.C.5
below, this schizophrenic doctrine's existence might best be explained
by the schizophrenic Anglo-American definition of charity, and the
most effective cure may be a revision of that definition.

284. For purposes of my argument, it is sufficient to demonstrate that the
commerciality doctrine is vague and inconsistently applied. However, I do not want
to move on without at least mentioning that there are serious logical flaws embedded
within it. First, at its most general level the doctrine poses this nonsensical question:
Does the commercial activity in question have a commercial hue? Given that the
analysis begins with the identification of commercial conduct, it is difficult to fathom
how confirmation that the activity is indeed commercial moves the inquiry in a
meaningful direction or can furnish the basis of a principled judgment. Moreover, the
doctrine seems downright silly when it holds that profit generation is a key factor
weighing against tax-exempt status when charities' sole motivation for engaging in
commercial activity obviously is to generate revenue. Why else would they do it?
Finally, there is a serious logical flaw in the commerciality doctrine's mushy and illdefined analysis of competition and the cost of services. On one hand, courts frown
on exempt organizations that compete with commercial ventures.
Market
competition is (or at least was) considered to be strong evidence of nonexempt
commercial purposes. See, e.g., Fed'n Pharmacy Serv., Inc. v. Comm'r 72 T.C. 687,692
{1979); B.S.W. Group, Inc. v. Comm'r, 70 T.C. 352, 358 (1978). On the other hand,
courts favor organizations that charge fees that are below cost, viewing this as
evidence that the activities are being conducted for charitable purposes, not solely for
profit. See Peoples Transl. Serv./Newsfront Int'! v. Comm'r, 72 T.C. 42, 49 (1979); see
also Rev. Rul 68-306, 1968-1 C.B. 257 {granting exemption to a newspaper publisher
whose subscription was not enough to cover costs of the operation). The interplay of
these two factors puts charities in a no-win situation. They are expected to avoid
competing with for-profit businesses offering similar goods or services, yet they are
required to price their goods at discount rates to prove they are charitable. See
generally Pena & Reid, supra note 176, at 1873-76.
285. See Pena & Reid, supra note 176, at 1869.
286. See, e.g., Scripture Press Found. v. United States, 285 F.2d 800 (Ct. Cl. 1961);
see also Colombo, supra note 183, at 504-05.
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3. Unrelated Business Income Tax
The unrelated business income tax is another perplexing doctrine
that has evolved amidst our society's divided understanding of charity.
In 1950, Congress passed UBIT to prevent nonprofit charities from
engaging in unfair competition with for-profit enterprises.
In
Congress's view, formulated under heavy lobbying from small
business interests,287 the permissive income generation rules for
charity that had arisen as a result of the Trinidad decision, including
the destination-of-income test that allowed charities to engage in
practically unlimited commercial activity,288 also had permitted them
to compete unfairly with for-profit enterprises. Whether or not
commercial competition by charities is truly unfair,289 Congress took
action by adding the UBIT provision to the IRS Code.
The idea behind the passage of UBIT was that instead of banning
all commercial activity carried on by charities, Congress would force
them to compete fairly in the marketplace by taxing at normal
corporate rates all of their profits resulting from trade or business that
was not "substantially related" to the performance of their exempt
purposes. 290 In theory, charities would continue to be free to engage
in commercial activities related to their exempt purposes, although, as
discussed in Part 11.C.2 above, the commerciality doctrine has
rendered that assumption dangerous.
More precisely, according to IRS regulations a charity's income is
subject to UBIT when: (1) the income at issue results from a trade or
business; (2) the trade or business is regularly carried on by the
organization; and (3) the conduct of the trade or business is not
substantially related to the performance by the organization of its taxexempt functions. 291 Each of these three prongs is explained in pages
of complicated regulations, which make difficult going for
practitioners of nonprofit law and excellent material for law school
essay exams. The Code and regulations also outline several important
exceptions to UBIT, providing, for example, that income that
otherwise would be treated as unrelated is not taxed when it results
from business conducted by volunteers,292 when it is conducted for the
convenience of the organization's members, students, patients,
officers or employees,293 and when it results from thrift store sales.294
287. See Revenue Revision of 1942: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 77th Cong. 1612 (1942) [hereinafter Revenue Revision]; Colombo, supra
note 183, at 529; Henry B. Hansmann, Unfair Competition and the Unrelated Business
Income Tax, 75 Va. L. Rev. 605 (1989).
288. See supra notes 250-56 and accompanying text.
289. See infra notes 335-36 and accompanying text.
290. I.RC.§ 513(a) (2000); Treas. Reg.§ 1.513-l(a) (as amended in 1983).
291. Treas. Reg.§ 1.513-l(a).
292. I.RC. § 513(a)(l).
293. I.RC. § 513(a)(2).
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By carefully navigating the statutory exceptions and UBIT case law,
skillful attorneys and their savvy nonprofit clients have learned to
structure business operations to minimize and in most cases avoid
UBIT payments. 295 Interesting though they are, we will not spend
time exploring the intricacies of UBIT or charities' creative
countermeasures. Instead, we will confine our discussion to the
confusing ways it influences and interacts with the operational test
and the commerciality doctrine.
Although it is possible to draw logical connections between UBIT
and the operational test and commerciality doctrine, neither the IRS
nor the courts have defined how they interact. 296 Congress's adoption
of UBIT logically implied that it accepted that charities would engage
in commercial activities unrelated to (or, in the parlance of the
operational test, not in furtherance of) their exempt purposes, and
that those activities would be compatible with organizations' taxexempt status under the operational test, so long as their primary
purposes remained charitable.297 However, the doctrines have never
been harmonized officially, and charities still cannot predict when
judges or administrators will choose to tax their income under UBIT
rather than attack their tax exemptions under the operational test or
the commerciality doctrine.
At least some of the confusion surrounding the doctrines stems
from the fact that the determination of whether a charity must pay
UBIT is evaluated based on whether its profit-generating activity is
"related" to its exempt function. 298 The operational test, on the other
hand, decides whether an organization can maintain its exempt status
based on whether its "primary purpose" is charitable. The allimportant but vexing question for an entrepreneurial charity trying to
navigate these doctrines is whether an income-generating activity can
be "unrelated" to its exempt purpose and thus subject to UBIT, but at
the same time not interfere with its primary purpose such that it can
still pass the operational test. 299 As discussed above, we know the
general answer should be "yes, it is possible," because if deciding
authorities were to rule that all unrelated commercial activity
jeopardized tax-exempt status under the operational test, Congress's
passage of UBIT would be rendered a nullity.
294. I.RC.§ 513(a)(3).
295. See John M. Strefeler & Leslie T. Miller, Exempt Organizations: A Study of
Their Nature and the Applicability of the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 12 Akron
Tax J. 223, 272 (1996) (suggesting charitable organizations can avoid paying UBIT by
regularly updating their mission statements to encompass their commercial activities).
296. See Pena & Reid, supra note 176, at 1884.
297. See Treas. Reg.§ 1.501(c)(3)-l(c)(l), -l(e)(l) (as amended in 1990).
298. See I.RC.§ 5ll(a); Treas. Reg.§ 1.512(a)(l) (as amended in 2002).
299. As discussed in Part 11.C.2, supra, an organization engaged in commercial
activity that passes the operational test must under existing law still be wary of the
commerciality doctrine.
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How then should the doctrines be harmonized? Once an examining
court or administrative authority has determined that a charity is
engaged in an unrelated business activity, it should begin by taxing the
profits under UBIT. It should then go on to determine under the
operational test whether the unrelated commercial activity is so
substantial that the organization's "primary purpose" has been
compromised. Only if the answer to the latter question is affirmative
should the authority disqualify the organization.
Unfortunately, this is not how decision-making authorities have
applied the doctrines. Although the IRS formally recognizes that
there is a relationship between the operational test and UBIT, 300 it
routinely makes UBIT determinations without raising the question
whether the charity should lose its exempt status under the
operational test or the commerciality doctrine. 301 Its consistent
litigation strategy has been to present cases as either under the
operational test, commerciality doctrine, or UBIT, such that courts
rarely have the opportunity to consider the relationship between the
doctrines and no case law has developed to guide entrepreneurial
charities. 302 As a result, there is no way for charities to know how
much unrelated commercial activity they may engage in without
jeopardizing their tax-exempt status.
As was true when discussing the operational test and commerciality
doctrine, the explanation of the confusion over UBIT and a solution
to the problem may be found in the history of charity.
4. The Commensurate-in-Scope Doctrine
In this incompatible patchwork of laws and regulations governing
entrepreneurial charities, the commensurate-in-scope doctrine has
evolved and is sometimes relied upon to fill in the practical and logical
holes created by the other doctrines. We will confine our discussion
of commensurate-in-scope to a f~w words.
The commensurate-in-scope doctrine suggests that a key issue in
determining if substantial unrelated business activity ( or, in terms of
the operational test, substantial activity not in furtherance of the
exempt purpose) is consistent with the organization's underlying
exemption is whether the revenue from such commercial activity is
spent to further the organization's charitable purpose. 303 In other
300. See Priv. Ltr. Ru!. 94-36-002 (Jan. 26, 1994).
301. See Pena & Reid, supra note 176, at 1885; see, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Ru!. 98-22-006
(Jan. 29, 1998); Priv. Ltr. Ru!. 97-03-025 (Oct. 21, 1996); see also Carle Found. v.
United States, 611 F.2d 1192 (7th Cir. 1979) (IRS contending that pharmacy sales to
the general public were unrelated business income to an exempt hospital without
raising the question of whether unrelated sales might lead to loss of exemption).
302. See Colombo, supra note 183, at 508; Pena & Reid, supra note 176, at 1883-84.
303. See Rev. Rul. 64-182, 1964-1 C.B. 186-87 (introducing the doctrine in a matter
involving a charity that derived revenues from unrelated rental income).
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words, if the reviewing authority applying the doctrine finds that the
organization's charitable program is "commensurate in scope" with its
financial resources, it will uphold the organization's exemption even if
the money is being produced through an activity that has nothing to
do with the charitable mission. Although the doctrine was first
enunciated in a 1964 Revenue Ruling, 304 the IRS recently has been
relying on it more frequently to determine whether charities that
engage in commercial activities unrelated to their missions should lose
their tax exemptions, 305 and some commentators argue that the
doctrine has begun to replace the primary purpose analysis of the
operational test. 306
The rise of commensurate-in-scope is relevant to our historical
analysis of charity law in two respects. First, it might offer a partial
explanation of many of the seemingly inexplicable commerciality
doctrine cases, even though it was never mentioned as grounds for
these decisions. 307 For example, in the Aid to Artisans, Inc . v.
Commissioner case an organization that produced significant income
from selling goods produced by poor artisans from other countries
was permitted to keep its tax exemption where most of the profits
being generated by the commercial activity were being ploughed back
into the organization's charitable work. 308 Similarly, in Industrial Aid
for the Blind v. Commissioner, an organization that purchased and
sold goods made by blind individuals was able to maintain its
exemption where the facts indicated that most of the income went to
fund the organization's charitable mission. 309 In contrast, religious
publishers such as Scripture Press that appeared to the court to be
hoarding profits and paying employees high salaries without spending
significant sums on activities that were traditionally charitable lost
their exemptions. 310
Second, it is worth noting that the commensurate-in-scope doctrine
appears to have much in common with the old destination-of-income
test. 311 Under both, courts and administrators seem to be comfortable
saying that so long as the money is going to serve genuine charitable
purposes, we do not really mind that it is being produced by unrelated
commercial activity. The difference, of course, is that under the
304. Id.
305. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200-21-056 (Feb. 8, 2000) (income from tearoom
unrelated to charitable purpose is subject to UBIT but does not invalidate exempt
status where profits were used to fund charitable activities); Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-36001 (Jan. 4, 1995) (religious publisher is subject to UBIT but not loss of exemption
where funds were used to support educational mission).
306. See Hopkins, supra note 2, at 75.
307. See Colombo, supra note 183, at 513.
308. Aid to Artisans, Inc. v. Comm'r, 71 T.C. 202 (1978).
309. Indus. Aid for the Blind v. Comm'r, 73 T.C. 96 (1979).
310. Scripture Press Found. v. United States, 285 F.2d 800 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
311. See supra notes 255-56 and accompanying text.
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destination-of-income test, the organization producing the income
escaped taxation, whereas, under the combination of UBIT and the
commensurate-in-scope doctrine, unrelated income is taxed at normal
corporate rates. Still, both doctrines allow judges and administrators
to do what they have been chafing to do since the earliest reported
American legal decisions on charity: permit and even encourage
commercial activities that support vulgar charity while squelching
money-making activities that do not look and smell sufficiently
charitable.
5. Summary and Conclusion
From the beginning, American charity law has been premised on an
inconsistent understanding of what charity means: aid to the poor
based on indiscriminate compassion, or social engineering grounded
in the Protestant work ethic. The division can be detected in the
earliest state law decisions and throughout the development of the
federal tax law pertaining to charity.
This definitional uncertainty has led to contemporary legal
doctrines that are vague and unworkable. Judges and administrators
apply the closely related operational test and commerciality doctrine
interchangeably to grant or revoke charitable exempt status based on
an ever-shifting array of factors that seem to boil down to whether the
mission and activities of the organization in question are appealing.
Judges often find commercial activity unappealing and thus unlawful,
particularly where the charity's mission focuses more on public benefit
and social engineering than service to the poor.
The commensurate-in-scope doctrine is sometimes (but sometimes
not) applied in place of the operational test's "substantiality"
determination. Its role appears to be to permit decision makers to
approve of charitable status for commercial charities that have
appealing missions and that spend most of their commercially raised
funds on their charitable purposes.
UBIT springs from a firm statutory base but adds to charities'
confusion because no one can reliably predict where taxation under
UBIT ends and revocation of exempt status under the operational test
and commerciality doctrine begins.
Further complicating the
application of UBIT, many charities and judges have difficulty
determining which activities are "substantially related" to their
charitable purposes in a context where no one is quite sure what
charity really means. From the perspective of charities, particularly
entrepreneurial, income-generating charities, decision makers wield
the law arbitrarily, limiting the entrepreneurial activities of charities
that come before them based solely on their intuitive sense that
commerce and charity are incompatible.
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An explanation of the muddled American law of charity can be
found in our history. Our cultural and legal definition of charity has
evolved since the time of Henry VIII and Elizabeth I to encompass a
broad array of socially-beneficial activities that have nothing to do
with aiding the poor and needy. But in spite of that evolution, judges,
administrators, and policymakers have never abandoned the older,
stricter conception of charity as aid to the poor and distressed.
Without articulating what they were doing, perhaps without even
realizing it, American decision makers have consistently tugged the
law back toward its vulgar roots. When a charitable organization
today engages in what an administrator or judge feels is too much
commerce-particularly where that organization combines commerce
with a charitable mission that does not focus on aiding the poor and
distressed-that administrator or judge will grasp for a legal
mechanism to draw charity back toward its compassionate, JudeoChristian origins.
But our federal tax law, which is now the de facto policing agency
for most American charities, 312 lacks a legal category or language to
describe the sort of compassion-based, poverty-focused activity that
comprises the roots of vulgar Anglo-American charity. Judges find
themselves relying on vague and malleable legal doctrines such as
commerciality, and vaporous legal tests such as "all the
circumstances," to permit them to act on their intuitive beliefs that
charity is about loving and serving the poor and distressed, regardless
of what the IRS Code says about the permissibility of general "public
benefit" and commercial activities. 313 This exercise of judicial
intuition makes for bad law.
In the end, all that modern, entrepreneurial charities can garner
from the confusing welter of doctrines that spring from our divided
history of charity is that courts and the IRS will accept some measure
of commercial activity, and that they are likely to permit more such
activity if the charitable work of the organization at issue is
appealingly vulgar, and if a high percentage of the funds being
produced as a result of the commercial activity is being spent on the
appealing charitable mission. Beyond that, charities can predict little.
The IRS has on at least one occasion owned up to its part in the
confusion. In a 1971 General Counsel's memorandum it declared:
[F]or some time now it has been increasingly apparent that our
earlier approach to the problem of permissibility or nonpermissibility of business activities of charities has been based on a
misconception that somehow in the enactment of the provisions for
exemptions of charities from income tax, Congress intended an
312. See supra note 4.
313. See Hopkins, supra note 2, at 829 (arguing that judges take "intuitive offense"
at the notion that a charity is doing something that more properly belongs in the
domain of for-profit organizations); see also Pena & Reid, supra note 176, at 1868-69.
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implied restriction on the extent of their engagement in business
activities. In the years past, the Service sought by ruling and by
litigation to deny the right of charities to engage in business,
insisting that somewhere, somehow in the enactment of the
exemption provisions Congress must have intended to limit the
classification of exempt charities to those charities not engaged to
any substantial extent in commercial endeavors. 314

These wise words could have added clarity to the government's
regulation of charities, but they apparently were ignored by IRS
litigators and courts, who continue, decades later, to challenge the
notion that entrepreneurial, fee-generating organizations-especially
those that do not serve the poor and distressed-can be charitable.315
III. WHAT Is TO BE DONE?
In Part I of this Article we saw that the Anglo-American cultural
and legal definition of charity came to encompass two very different
notions: aid to the poor on one hand and social engineering for the
benefit of the general public on the other. The former insisted on
compassionate help for those in need regardless of their worthiness
while the latter emphasized the importance of work and held that the
"sturdy poor" could justly be left to starve. Both understandings of
charity persisted through the late Middle Ages, and were transferred
to the New World.
In Part II, we traced the development of the American law of
charity and showed that its split definition led to inconsistent
treatment in early case law, and, more recently, to incoherent federal
legal standards. From our earliest history, charitable organizations
have been pushed to engage in ever more social engineering and
poverty management-often paying their own way by engaging in
commercial activity-while judges and administrators, who have
taken intuitive offense at this commercialization, have worked to tug
charity back toward its compassionate, poverty-focused roots. The
result has been confusion, particularly in recent years, as changes in
government policy and funders' expectations have compelled charities
to turn more aggressively toward the marketplace.
In Part III of this Article, we will address briefly the question of
what is to be done: whether there is a sensible way out of our present
fix in which charities are compelled by government policy and societal
preference to become entrepreneurial and self-supporting, but are
arbitrarily penalized by the law for doing so. The discussion below
does not offer a fully formed statutory scheme, but rather a broad
suggestion for appropriate reform formulated in light of American
charity's complicated history and present legal fix.
314. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,682 (Nov. 17, 1971).
315. See Colombo, supra note 183, at 511.
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A. A Reformed Legal Definition of Charity

American charity laws are confused and confusing because of the
inconsistent cultural and legal definition of charity itself. Why not
then alter the definition of charity, at least for purposes of federal tax
law, in a way that both honors and clarifies our divergent traditions?
Let us create a new subcategory of charitable organizations-call
them vulgar charities-whose missions and resources are devoted
exclusively to serving the poor. We must leave as a matter for debate
and statutory drafting exactly which organizations will qualify for this
designation and which will not, but we can begin here by sketching the
broad outlines.
Most organizations that today obtain tax exemption under section
501(c)(3) as "public benefit organizations" will not qualify as vulgar
charities. Thus, health care organizations and educational institutions
that serve the general public and do not focus on the poor will not
qualify. Nor will arts programs geared toward the general public,
middle- and upper-class neighborhood associations, garden societies,
symphony orchestras, the Boy or Girl Scouts of America, or YMCAs
that cater to fitness buffs in upscale communities.
The category of vulgar charities would include the panoply of
organizations whose missions involve serving the poor. Job training
programs, community economic development and low-cost housing
organizations that focus on disadvantaged neighborhoods, boys' and
girls' clubs in low-income communities, no-cost and low-cost
community-based health clinics, organizations that serve poor artisans
from developing countries, and of course soup kitchens all would
qualify. 316 In effect, the new category would group together those
organizations that judges and administrators long have been
intuitively grouping together and protecting by finding reasons to give
them a "pass" under incoherent legal doctrines such as commerciality.
Concrete advantages would accrue to those charitable organizations
deemed vulgar. The vagaries of contemporary tax law doctrines
316. Formulating the precise contours of the new legal category will prove
challenging. Defining "poor" is relatively straightforward: Regulations already exist
that define poverty as a percentage of median income. Such definitions are
frequently relied upon by, among others, organizations that develop low-income
housing. A more difficult policy question would arise as to whether the new legal
category should include not only the poor but also the "distressed." If this new
category is to remain consonant with history, any broadening of the category of
"distressed" would have to be confined to people who are incapable of helping
themselves. Thus, an organization such as the Betty Ford clinic that helps wealthy
addicts face their addictions would not qualify, because their clients typically can
afford to pay for high-priced treatment. On the other hand, a drug rehabilitation
facility aimed at low- and moderate-income individuals-those who typically could
not afford to pay for such services-might qualify. Similarly, elder-care organizations
geared toward the well-off would not qualify as vulgar, while those dedicated to
caring for low- and moderate-income individuals could.
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would disappear, and they would be governed by the perm1ss1ve
destination-of-income test that was launched in the wake of the
Trinidad opinion and later squelched by the commerciality doctrine
and UBIT. 317 Those charities devoted to serving the poor would be
given broad latitude to earn income to support their missions in
whatever way they decide. Traditional charities could launch feegenerating enterprises related to their charitable missions (which,
under existing federal law they should be able to do anyway,
notwithstanding the commerciality doctrine ),318 but they also could
choose to launch unrelated businesses to cross-subsidize their
charitable work. Such organizations would continue to answer to
regulators under intermediate sanctions, 319 the private inurement
doctrine, 320 and the operational test321 to ensure that the profits
generated by their enterprises were in fact going to serve the poor;
however, these charities would no longer live under the vague and
confusing specter of commerciality, UBIT, and commensurate-inscope.322
This refined definition of charity would have several salutary
effects. First, it would create a more consistent and predictable legal
framework in which vulgar charities could plan and carry out their
missions. Rather than struggling with a legal regime in which judges
and administrators make ad hoc decisions regarding charitable status,
twisting the law to satisfy their and society's intuitive sense that there
ought to be a special place for charity directed toward the poor, the
new definition would create a legally recognized and favored category
so that they (the judges) and we (society) could do it explicitly and
consistently. This new legal category would acknowledge that the
work of serving the poor needs to be done ( even if only by creating
the conditions under which the poor and distressed can help
themselves), that few are willing to pay for it with their tax dollars,
that charities are being forced to embrace entrepreneurial solutions to
pay their own way, and that it is simply wrong to insist that charities
adopt the methods and ethos of commerce while at the same time
punishing them for doing so.
Such a reform also would be consonant with our multifarious
history of charity. Instead of chafing against history, this reform
would embrace it and allow it to strengthen our law. This new
317. See supra notes 253-61 and accompanying text.
318. See supra Part 11.C.2.
319. See I.RC§ 4958 (2000).
320. See Treas. Reg.§ l.501(a)-l(c) (as amended in 1982).
321. See Treas. Reg.§ l.501(c)(3)-l(c) (as amended in 1990).
322. Other commentators have advocated simplifying or eliminating aspects of the
operational test. See, e.g., Colombo, supra note 183, at 549 (suggesting reforming the
operational test to include a bright line measure of charitability by examining
charities' gross expenditures and comparing related and unrelated activity); Pena &
Reid, supra note 176, at 1863 (same).
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definition would acknowledge that, in spite of the passage of five
hundred years since the Church of England began to pull charity from
its Judeo-Christian roots, the ancient tradition of charity as succor to
the poor persists as an important cultural value. At the same time, the
proposed reform would leave in place the broader, common law
definition of charity provided by the Statute of Charitable Uses, 323
Lord McNaughten's case, 324 and, since the IRS administratively
revised American law in the early 1950s,325 the Federal Internal
Revenue Code. 326 The category of "non-vulgar charities" would
include everything that today qualifies under section 501(c)(3), minus
the vulgar charities, which would enjoy their own more privileged
category.
Finally, the reform would acknowledge the role that work and
commerce play in the realm of American charity. It would take
account of the historical truth that, since the earliest Anglo-American
charity laws, our society and legal system have considered commercial
enterprise an acceptable, even laudable tool for addressing the needs
of the poor, though not necessarily of serving the public benefit.
Likewise, it would acknowledge that in recent years the phenomenon
of adopting commerce as a tool for achieving charitable ends has
moved, for better or worse, to the center of American charity.
This definitional reform, proposed here in broad outline, would add
clarity and consistency to American law by bringing our legal system
into closer conformity with our society's historic and contemporary
323. See supra notes 75-76.
324. See supra note 77.
325. See supra notes 220-22 and accompanying text.
326. Those organizations that qualify under today's standards for section 501(c)(3)
tax exemption but do not qualify under the proposed category of "traditional
charities" would continue to live under the rules they live by today, although those
rules also could benefit from substantial reform. The notorious commerciality
doctrine would be a good place to begin. Although an ideal course of action would be
to entirely scrap commerciality, it is difficult to see how that could be accomplished
elegantly after more than fifty years of case law. An acceptable alternative would be
to ask Congress to codify the doctrine, making it clear that although commerciality
(along with UBIT) was developed to prevent charities from unfairly competing with
for-profit enterprises, that reasoning was flawed and should no longer be even
nominally part of the legal analysis. Second, a codification of the commerciality
doctrine should make clear that it does not exist to ensnare legitimate charities that
generate income-even significant amounts of income-from commercial activities
that are related to, and in furtherance of, their charitable missions. Finally, a
codification and improvement of commerciality would make clear that it is rooted
firmly within the IRS's operational test, rather than being a free-floating doctrine to
be used at the whim of judges and administrators. As such, the commerciality
doctrine's sole function would be to police the boundary between permissible
unrelated income-generating activity subject to UBIT, and impermissible unrelated
income-generating activity that jeopardized the organization's exemption. In other
words, the commerciality doctrine would become the means by which judges and
administrators would decide whether commercial activity had become the
organization's primary purpose.
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conception of charity. It would satisfy our society's obligation to
provide for the poor, even if only by permitting the poor to provide
for themselves without interference. Perhaps most important, it
would solve a knotty legal problem by eliminating judges' intuitive
need to invent or twist doctrines to winnow inappropriately
commercial charities from the rest.
B. Objections to the Proposed Reforms: Unfair Competition, Tax
Base Erosion, Loss of Halo Effect
Altering the legal definition of charity would not be a simple
process. In addition to the challenge of drafting a workable definition
of vulgar charity,327 any reform that has the effect of permitting
charities to engage more freely in commercial activity will meet with
strenuous objection, mostly from outside the world of charity. Three
objections merit special attention.
1. Unfair Competition
If recent history is a guide, the earliest and loudest objections will
come from for-profit businesses. 328 Since the Trinidad case launched
the era of nonprofit "feeder" corporations,329 business interests have
protested what they claim is unfair competition coming from
nonprofit charities that engage in commerce. 330
This alleged
unfairness was a prime justification leading to the passage of UBIT in
1950.331
Then as now, 332 the for-profit business community's
objections focus on two nonprofit tendencies that it deems unfair.
First, for-profits claim that charitable, tax-exempt businesses engage
in predatory pricing, using their comparative advantage-a lighter tax
burden- to unfairly lower their prices and steal clients from for-profit
firms. 333 The second, related, objection is that nonprofit charitable
organizations, which enjoy comparatively large profit margins due to
their tax-advantaged status, plough those marginal profits into market
expansion, aiming to squeeze out for-profit businesses. 334

327. See supra note 316.
328. See Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Bus. Admin., Unfair Competition With
Small Business (1986); Hansmann, supra note 287, at 605.
329. See supra notes 255-56 and accompanying text.
330. See Revenue Revision, supra note 287; see also Colombo, supra note 183, at
529.
331. See S. Rep. No. 85-2375, at 28-29 (1950); H.R. Rep. No. 85-2319, at 36-37
(1950); see also Columbo, supra note 183, at 529.
332. See Unrelated Business Income Tax: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 100th Cong. 98-99 (1987)
(statement of Frank S. Swain, Chief Counsel for Advocacy, U.S. Small Business
Administration).
333. See Colombo, supra note 183, at 529-31.
334. See id.
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Although Congress seems to have found these claims of unfair
competition persuasive,335 commentators have not. There is seeming
unanimity among legal academics and economists who have wrestled
with the unfairness issue that although competition from non-profit
enterprises may be unwanted by for-profit businesses, it is not
unfair. 336 In lay terms, they found that the goal of nonprofit managers
who engage in commercial activity is to produce revenue to subsidize
their charitable missions. Because their goal-just like for-profit
businesses-is to maximize revenue, they have no motivation to
charge anything lower than what the market will bear. There simply is
no theoretical or empirical basis for the claim of price gouging. 337
Similarly, studies find no empirical evidence to support claims of
unfair, subsidized market expansion. They suggest that charitable
managers, rather than scheming to undercut for-profit competition,
expand market share and force for-profit operators out of business, do
exactly what we would hope they would do: They maximize their
profits and devote them to serving their charitable missions. 338
There is also a broader policy argument that undercuts for-profit
business' objections to entrepreneurial charities. It is the same
argument we have mentioned above and will mention below: It
simply is not fair for our society to tell charities that they must fend
for themselves by competing in the market, and at the same time force
them to compete wearing the shackles of the charity law doctrines.
It may well be true that policy decisions taken since the Reagan era
to shift the cost of caring for the poor away from government and
toward the free market have placed a disproportionate share of that
burden on owners of for-profit businesses that supply goods and
services to the general public. As discussed above, they will not face
unfair competition as a result of this shift, but they may face more
competition. If we as a society find this burden shifting unacceptable,
335. It is difficult to judge the precise degree to which Congress was persuaded.
Although the legislative history accompanying UBIT states clearly that unfair
competition was a prime motivation behind its passage, the legislation as passed
focused the inquiry on whether or not the activity at issue was related to the
organization's charitable mission. Competition with for-profit firms is not, and never
has been, included as part of the legal analysis. See I.RC.§ 513(a) (2000); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.513-l(a) (as amended in 1983).
336. Colombo, supra note 183, at 530; see Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert,
The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal Income Taxation, 85 Yale
L.J. 299, 318-25 (1976); William A Klein, Income Taxation and Legal Entities, 20
UCLA L. Rev. 13, 61-68 (1972) (arguing that Congress's passage of UBIT was a
response to the "paranoid delusion" of unfair competition); Susan Rose-Ackerman,
Unfair Competition and Corporate Income Taxation, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 1017 (1982).
337. See Hansmann, supra note 287, at 610-12.
338. See Burton A Weisbrod, Modeling the Nonprofit Organization as a
Multiproduct Firm: A Framework for Choice, in To Profit or Not to Profit, supra note
192, at 47. It should not be forgotten that legal doctrines exist-intermediate
sanctions, private inurement, the operational test-to identify and punish
organizations that act as nonprofits in disguise.
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we can debate whether to shift it back to the government or to some
other sector of society. Until and unless that happens, we should not
be persuaded by arguments that, in essence, complain that nonprofits
are sometimes beating for-profit enterprises at their own game.
2. Tax Base Erosion
In 1993, a series of investigative articles ran in the Philadelphia
Inquirer documenting waste, fraud, and abuse in the nonprofit sector.
Among other condemning facts, the authors reported that the
nonprofit sector's activities cost the country over $36 billion per year
in lost revenue due to the tax-exempt status of nonprofit
organizations. 339 When regulation of the nonprofit sector is debated in
Congress, tax base erosion is always high on the list of concerns. 340
It is not only lawmakers who worry about broad tax exemptions for
charities. Economists and lawyers have put forward arguments to
demonstrate that subsidizing charitable activity through tax
exemption is an economically inefficient means of accomplishing
socially necessary ends. They suggest that we as a people would spend
our money more wisely if we directly subsidized socially necessary and
useful charitable activities. 341 It is beyond my ken and beyond the
scope of this Article to grapple with those economic efficiency
arguments, but it may also be unnecessary.
A debate over economic inefficiency is unnecessary because if we as
a society have formed a political consensus on any issue in recent
decades, it is that we prefer not to provide social services through the
mediating influence of the government. 342 We prefer that the work of
aiding the poor and distressed pay for itself, and to the extent it
cannot and government must step into the fray with funding, we
prefer to furnish that funding directly to consumers and let service
providers compete against one another in the market for those scarce
funds. 343
Having made the choice as a matter of policy and politics that we
would not directly subsidize charitable work but would indirectly
support its socially beneficial work by exempting it from taxation, it
simply is not acceptable to critique the system as eroding the tax base.

339. Gilbert M. Gaul & Neill A. Borowski, Nonprofits: America's Growth
Industry, Phila. Inquirer, Apr. 18, 1993, at 1 (the first in a series of articles presented
under the title Warehouses of Wealth, beginning April 18, 1993 and continuing
through April 23, 1993).
340. See Unrelated Business Income Tax: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 100th Cong. 98-99 (1987);
Revenue Revision, supra note 287; S. Rep. No. 85-2375, at 28-29 (1950); H.R. Rep. No.
85-2319, at 36-37 (1950).
341. See generally Colombo, supra note 183, at 538-44.
342. See supra Part 11.C.
343. See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
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The work of supporting and providing for the poor and distressed, and
the work of accomplishing social benefits not provided by the market,
is expensive. We can pay for it through direct subsidies. We can pay
for it by the indirect subsidy of a tax exemption. But what we cannot
do, or at least should not do, is decide to keep charities alive through
indirect subsidy of tax exemption, and then complain that the indirect
subsidy is overly burdensome.
3. Loss of the Halo
Arguments attacking broad charitable tax exemptions on grounds
of unfair competition and tax base erosion generally come from
outside the world of charity. However, the proposed notion of taking
the fetters off of vulgar charities and permitting them to raise
operating funds in whatever commercial manner they please would
also face criticism from within the world of charity.
The critique from within harkens back to charity's pre-Reformation
roots described in Part I.Al of this Article. In essence, it is that the
charitable sector has always acted and should continue to act as a
guardian of values in our society. 344 Charity plays a vital role in our
culture because people trust it:
They trust that charitable
organizations are motivated by love and compassion, not by desire for
lucre. 345 If we permit charitable organizations to engage in unfettered
commercial activity, the argument goes, the boundaries that exist
between the worlds of charity and for-profit businesses will fade. 346
Inevitably, commercial activity will displace charity's core values of
compassion and love, and society will cease to view the sector as a
special guardian of our cherished values. 347 Once this happens, people
will no longer be willing to donate their hard-earned money to
charities, and, eventually, will be unwilling to support tax exemptions
to enable their work.
Responses are varied. Evelyn Brody and others have produced a
body of work arguing that the sectoral boundaries between for-profit
and charity are largely illusory, and that rational public policy should
move toward funding socially beneficial work regardless of whether it
springs from the commercial or charitable sector. 348 Others have
344. See supra notes 194-96 and accompanying text; see also The Resilient Sector,
supra note 158, at 11.
345. See Clotfelter & Ehrlich, supra note 192, at 511; Janne G. Gallagher, Peddling
Products: The Need to Limit Commercial Behavior by Nonprofit Organizations, 12
Exempt Org. Tax Rev. 1007, 1014 (1995).
346. C!otfelter & Ehrlich, supra note 192, at 511.
347. See Colombo, supra note 183, at 534 (referring to the "diversion problem"
argument, by which the attention of charity managers is diverted from core charitable
missions to commercial activity).
348. Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals: The Economic Convergences of the
Nonprofit and For-Profit Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 457,461, 53536 (1996).
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produced empirical research to indicate that charity managers are in
fact able to continue to focus on their core charitable missions while
raising money through commercial enterprise. 349 Thus, it may be
possible for charity to continue to wear its halo and maintain its
trusted status even if it does continue to turn toward the market.
Ultimately, however, the response to this critique is that the horse is
out of the barn. As described in detail in Part I of this Article, for
hundreds of years Anglo-American charity has embraced work and
commerce as vital tools for achieving charitable ends, and recent
American history has pushed charity decisively toward the market.
This insistence on entrepreneurship and profit-making among
charities may prove to be a positive development or a negative
development, but it is a development that seems bound to continue,
and charities and the rest of society must acknowledge that fact and
make adjustments in our law to fit the reality we have created.
CONCLUSION

This Article has argued that we in the United States, particularly
those of us who pay attention to our laws and legal system, should not
continue to do what we are doing: We should not as a society
continue to push charitable organizations toward the free market and
the ideal of financial self-support while permitting our legal system to
threaten them and punish them for doing so.
Before drawing the discussion to a close, it is important to run
through a few conclusions for which this Article does not stand. First,
although it suggests creating a new category of vulgar charities, this
Article should not be read as supporting the proposition that we in
America would be better off hewing more closely and exclusively to a
spiritually infused, compassion-based version of charity. There are
compelling arguments to the contrary: That such charity is inevitably
donor-focused; that it tends to be condescending and rob initiative
from the people it purports to serve; and that it takes the fight out of
young idealists from the wealthier classes, who come to believe that
spooning soup at the local homeless shelter is the most powerful, if
not the only, action they can take to affect the plight of the poor and
distressed. 350 This Article only makes the point that such charity is an
enduring part of our culture. It has not disappeared in the centuries
since the English Reformation, it is unlikely to disappear in the near
future, and therefore American charity law should take account of it.
Similarly, this Article should not be read as supporting the policies
that were launched during the Reagan administration and maintained
in one form or another through subsequent administrations that, at
least rhetorically, left the work of supporting the poor and distressed
349. See, e.g., Weisbrod, supra note 192, at 47-64.
350. See generally Wagner, supra note 6, at 173-74.
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to well-meaning volunteers. 351 Person-to-person, voluntary charity
can accomplish good work on behalf of those in need, and it is at the
heart of those communitarian values that remain in our society, but it
is not and never will be sufficient to serve the legitimate needs of
those at the bottom who are searching for ladders or the materials to
build their own. 352
Finally, although in this Article I describe the increasing
commercialization of American charity and argue that our law should
adapt to accommodate the trend, I do not intend to take the position
that this increasing commercialization of charity is an entirely
laudable trend. Good may come from it. Infusing charity with a spirit
of entrepreneurship opens up exciting possibilities for people of
limited wealth and power to take charge of their futures and improve
their own lots. Because self-supporting charities receive less financial
input from government and philanthropy, they are less beholden to
those actors' priorities and better able to develop strategies and
programs that appropriately serve their stakeholders' needs.
However, I share concerns, described in Part 11.B.3 above, about
losing public trust for the charitable sector. There is something more
than sentimental longing in the claim that charity creates a space
within our society where the cooperative instincts hardwired within us
are honored and supported. Along with the judges and administrators
whose legal rulings I criticized above, I carry within me an instinctual
sense that we as a society ought to maintain a sector in which values of
compassion, love, and communitarian spirit are paramount, a sector
that society can trust to focus on the needs of the least of us rather
than on generating profits.
What this Article does stand for is one fairly narrow proposition:
We should act now to eliminate the legal double bind that we have
created for contemporary American charities. If we take it as a given
that society in general and our government and philanthropic
community in particular will continue to expect charities to be
entrepreneurial and self-supporting, then we should not allow our
legal system to threaten and to penalize them when they comply with
those dictates. I have proposed one way out of this double bind of
creating the category of vulgar charity. It would call on us to
acknowledge that Anglo-American history has left us with a split
definition of charity. It would further require acknowledging that our
culture and our law long ago began to insist upon work and enterprise
351. See supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text. Each administration has
couched this desire to return to vulgar, compassionate charity in different rhetorical
guises. The phrase described George H.W. Bush's yearning for vulgar charity as
"points of light." The Clinton administration combined the spirit of volunteerism
with government funding and private sector methodologies under the rubric of
AmeriCorps. George W. Bush added a more evangelical twist to his administration's
push for vulgar charity with his Faith Based Initiative.
352. See Wagner, supra note 6, at 165-68.
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as means of accomplishing charitable ends. Next, it would require us
to acknowledge that judges and administrative authorities have
repeatedly shown that they are comfortable permitting charities to
engage in commercial enterprise, so long as the resulting profits serve
vulgar, not merely public-benefit, charitable purposes, even though
there is no clear legal doctrine that permits them to draw this
distinction. Finally, it would mean surrendering to this tension by
creating a new legal category of vulgar charities that would permit
charities working on behalf of the poor to engage openly in
commerce, and would free courts and administrators to focus on
charitable organizations that fall into the more general public-benefit
classification.

